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ABSTRACT
ENVER PASHA AND THE POLITICAL CURRENTS IN THE LATE
OTTOMAN PERIOD
Özmen, Ayşe Gülnı
M. A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya
September 2000
This thesis analyzes the dominant political currents in the Ottoman 
Empire at the turn of the twentieth century- namely Pan- Turkism, Pan- 
Islamism, Ottomanism- and aims to figure out which of these currents that 
Enver Pasha mostly emphasized. Within this context, the emergence of the 
Pan- movements, competing ideologies in the late Ottoman period, the role 
of Enver Pasha within the CUP and his activities and statements which can 
be incorporated with these ideologies will be discussed. The thesis also trace 
the different arguments made by historians regarding the political 
preferences of Enver Pasha. It will seek to answer questions such as, which 
of these ideologies Enver Pasha used interchangebly, what were the external 
and internal circumstances that influenced his position and why there are 
many divergent arguments about his political preferences.
Keywords: Enver Pasha, Pan- movements, CUP, Pan- Turkism, Pan- 
Islamism, Ottomanism
ÖZET
SON DÖNEM OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU’NDA POLİTİK 
AKIMLAR VE ENVER PAŞA
Özmen, Ayşe Gülru
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Ass. Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya
Eylül 2000
Bu çalışma, yirminci yüzyılın hemen başında Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğumdaki en etkin politik akımları- Pan- Türkizm, Pan- İslamizm 
ve Osmanlıcılık- incelemekte ve Enver Paşa’nın bunlardan hangisini en 
fazla vurguladığını belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, pan 
hareketlerin doğuşu, geç Osmanlı döneminde birbiriyle çelişen ideolojiler, 
Enver Paşa’nın İ.T.C içindeki yeri ve bu ideolojiler ile ilişkilendirilebilecek 
faaliyetleri ve açıklamaları tartışılacaktır. Bu çalışma ayrıca tarihçiler 
tarafından yapılan Enver Paşa’nm politik tercihleri konusundaki değişik 
iddiaları da inceleyecektir. Bu ideolojilerin hangilerinin Enver Paşa 
tarafından birlikte kullanıldığı, konumunu belirleyen iç ve dış faktörlerin ne 
olduğu ve onun politik seçimleri hakkında neden bu kadar çelişen iddialar 
bulunduğu gibi sorulara da cevap arayacaktır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Enver Paşa, Pan Hareketler, İ.T.C, Pan- Türkizm, Pan­
islamizm, Osmanlıcılık
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INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the twentieth century, there were different political currents, 
which were competing with each other in order to determine the very existence and 
the future destiny of the Ottoman Empire, which was in serious decline. The political 
and social debate has often described as going between three ideologies: 
Ottomanism, the ideal of a union of the different communities around the Ottoman 
throne; Pan- Islamism, which sought to regenerate the empire on the basis of Islamic 
practices and of solidarity within the Islamic Ümmet (Community); and Pan- 
Turkism, which sought the union of the Turkic peoples. Besides, some scholarly 
writings authors have sometimes add a fourth current in their narratives of the 
intellectual life of the period: Westernism, the movement to adopt European 
techniques and ideas, which they contrast with Islamic traditionalism.
The debates on the fundamental problem of regeneration of state and society 
included two constantly recurring themes. These were whether Westernization was 
needed or acceptable, and of what was to be the basis for identification with and 
loyalty to the future Ottoman State. It was on this second aspect that Ottomanists, 
Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists differed. The ideological currents were not mutually 
exclusive either: many Young Turks, who rationally supported the idea of 
Ottomanism, were emotionally attached to romantic Pan- Turkism and devout 
Muslims same time.
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These debates were often carried out by intellectuals and a number of groups 
of military officers and thus usually reflected through publications. Hence, their 
impacts were seen firstly in cultural terms and limited to the educated groups only. If 
they were to establish a strong organization, they turned out to be political so did 
they soon.
One of the most important figures among these activists was Enver Pasha, 
who was a young military officer at the time during which these ideological debates 
occupied the political agenda of the Ottoman Empire. There are different arguments 
regarding which of these three dominant political currents Enver Pasha mostly 
emphasized during his lifetime. In fact, it is hard to find a common ground about his 
political preferences. Undoubtedly, due to the internal and external circumstances, he 
emphasized them interchangeably and most probably, this was the cause for the 
emergence of challenging arguments about him among the historians.
The research question of this thesis is to figure out to which political current 
or currents of that time Enver Pasha adopted in political decisions and positions 
towards several issues mainly on the Ottoman diplomacy. We assume that Enver 
Pasha employed different and/ or conflicting strategies and policies due to the 
political circumstances. He was not pragmatic, but influenced by the external factors. 
In order to clarify the conflicting views of the historians about Enver Pasha’s 
political preferences, this thesis attempts to reinterpret his statements and activities in 
the lights of new documents, namely his private correspondence.
The thesis presents a historical- descriptive approach by using both original 
and secondary sources. Both his correspondence and various interpretations on his 
statements and activities which appeared in several biographical and monographic 
studies are taken into consideration. However, as the original letters of Enver Pasha
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were in Ottoman language, the Turkish translations are used. The first hand 
observations of Zeki Velidi Togan and Cemal Kutay about Enver Pasha, who knew 
him personally, are also incorporated in the concluding chapter.
In the first chapter, the pan- movements that were dominant throughout 
Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were depicted. Firstly, the 
socio- political background that prepared the ground for the emergence of pan­
movements in different parts of the world is presented. After that, the definition and 
some common characteristics of these movements are emphasized. A classification is 
also made in order to figure out their diverse aims, organizations and ideologies. In 
this respect, Pan- Arabism, Pan- Germanism, Pan- Islamism, Pan- Scandinavianism, 
Pan- Slavism and Pan- Turkism are considered. Pan- Americanism, Pan- Africanism 
and Pan- Iranism are eliminated as the former occurred in another continent and not 
directly influenced the “pan- isms” that occurred in the Ottoman Empire and the 
other two belonged to the second half of the twentieth century. Lastly, the interaction 
between these pan- movements is evaluated to describe the way they were influenced 
from each other.
In the second chapter, Pan- Turkism, Pan- Islamism and Ottomanism are 
presented in terms of both cultural and political terms in order to understand then- 
evolution and the impacts. While doing this, the clash of these ideologies with 
reference to Yusuf A kkra’s famous article utJg Tarz-i Siyasef’ ( Three Types of 
Policies) is analyzed. At the end, the arguments made by H.B.Paksoy, Ahmad Feroz, 
Melih Cevdet Anday and Erik J. Ziircher regarding the successes and failures of the 
three ideologies are discussed.
The role of Enver Pasha within the CUP is the main theme of the third 
chapter. The foundation and the roots of the committee are also described with
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reference to arguments of the different historians. The chapter also examines the 
second constitutional period and the political situation between 1909 and 1903 which 
were the most crucial cornerstones regarding the activities of the committee. Special 
emphasis is given to the structure and the role of Te§kilat-i Mahsusa within the CUP, 
which was on organization led by Enver Pasha in order to make political propaganda. 
The chapter ends with an analysis of the role of the CUP and Enver Pasha’s during 
World War I.
In the fourth chapter, the activities and sayings of Enver Pasha are analyzed 
in order to determine which of the political currents he was mostly emphasized in the 
service. While doing this, quotations are given from his letters. In this part, a 
chronological sequence is followed to observe the changes in his political 
preferences.
In the concluding chapter, the arguments of different historians about the 
political preferences of Enver Pasha are examined. In this way, it can be understood 
why there are diverse interpretations about his political choices and the argument 
presented in the last chapter can be compared to those of other historians.
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CHAPTER 1
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PAN- MOVEMENTS:
1.1 The socio-political background:
Unknown before the eighteenth century, when it originated in Northwestern 
Europe, nationalism spread with ever- growing rapidity first over all the European 
continent and then throughout the earth. As a phenomenon of Modem European 
history, the rise of nationalism is closely linked with the origins of popular 
sovereignty; the theory of government by the active "consent of the governed" and 
the growth of secularism. Its global standard of progress had been set for the rest 
of the world by France and Britain. Until that century, the necessary conditions for 
the evolution of "nation- states" in Western Europe had already been completed. 
According to Chazan (1991:1), nationalism in the nineteenth century, is an 
outgrowth of the complexities inherent in the notion of the nation- state. It was 
created to resist the religious ideologies which were dominant throughout the 
Middle Ages. At the first stage, it was completely a secular notion as it was 
suggested by the bourgeoisie, who wanted to overthrow the way of production that 
was determined by feodalism. In addition to this, the ideas of Enlightenment 
contributed to the dissolution of religious ideology
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After the French Revolution, all European states were influenced by the flow 
of liberal and nationalistic ideas, which can be considered among the direct 
consequences of the revolution. While this situation resulted in chaos, it also led to 
the creation of more productive social and political institutions. To challenge this 
brand new form, decisions of the Vienna Congress of 1815 were put into force. 
However, the clash between the new forms- industrial revolution, liberalism and 
nationalism- ,and the old forms- monarchy, church and feodalism-, resulted in 
series of revolutions in Europe in 1830 and 1848.
Especially after the 1848 Revolution, the term nationalism, which can be 
interpreted as "self- determination" ( Sander, 1992: 138) emerged as one of the 
dominant currents. From this point of view, nationalism can be conceived as the 
logical outcome of liberalism and progressed in parallel terms with it. On every 
occasion, nationalism supported the social needs of the people. While doing this, it 
created diverse conditions and trends. For example, in Italy and Germany- where 
there existed a nation, but not a nation- state- it led to unification. Under certain 
circumstances, it turned to be a separatist movement to gain independence from 
the existing political authority as in the example of Poland, Ukraine, 
Czechoslovakia, Greece and Bulgaria. It also acquired different meanings for 
different nations. It was used for keeping the status quo as in the example of 
Austria- Hungary, Russia or the German Empire; for colonialism as promoted by 
France, England and Portugal or for economic expansionism as used by the United 
States.
Containing so many divergent meanings and functions, it is hard to make a 
classification regarding 'nationalism'. It is sometimes categorized according to its 
functions ( for example, building national unity), according to one of its aspects
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(for example, national language) or, according to a specific symbol (for example, 
nation- state) (Oran, 1997: 22). However for the purpose of this study, it is better 
to analyse its functioning in three different parts of Europe: Western Europe, 
Central Europe and Eastern Europe.
In the Western European territories, the function of nationalism was to solve 
the problem of where to direct the national faith. This problem appeared as a 
result of the efforts of the bourgeoisie, who were struggling to take the authority 
back from the king. In an industrial society, where the relationships became so 
diverse and complex, national faith had to be based upon a notion like 1 nation' 
including all the individuals. While this was the situation for the common people, 
bourgeoisie- who would not lean on national faith for itself- saw no risk to deliver 
it to the "nation". As they constituted the strongest class, they were going to 
represent the nation since only the ones, who could pay a certain amount of tax, 
were able to take seats in the parliament. The Western European nationalism was 
liberal, democratic and humanitarian (Oran, 1997: 55). It was liberal, as it was able 
to adopt a parlimantery system within the conditions determined by their maturity. 
It was democratic as they had captured authority before the proletariat became 
strong and organized. Finally, it was humanitarian since the pacemakers did not 
face the social disadvantages of industrialism because of their imperialistic 
activities. In other words, their nationalism was moderate.
According to Oran (1995: 58), nationalism in Central Europe functioned in a 
different way. The central government, which had been earlier achieved in 
Western Europe, resulting in the formation of a common market and emergence of 
national consciousness, was established much later in Germany The bourgeoisie 
was not strong enough to prevent the state intervention in a period of rising
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liberalism. What is more, there was a stronger and organized proliteriat who were 
ready to be active in politics. The state was concieved as the basis of individual 
rights rather than vice versa, which was the sign of weak national faith. After 
1815, the bourgeoisie started to emphasize liberalism and national unity. Hence, 
such emphasis on a unified state made German nationalism different from its 
western counterparts. Italy's understanding of nationalism was similiar to that of 
Germany in terms of national unity and consciousness.
In Eastern Europe, the main function of nationalism was to establish a 
nation- state which also required independence of these nations as they were under 
the sovereignty of other states. For this reason, the ultimate aim was to challenge 
the existing authorities and to establish new ones. The elite, rather than the middle 
class, were the active players throughout the nationalistic movements. On most 
occasions, the impetus came from outside. Balkan nationalism can be considered 
as the best example for this kind of nationalism.
When the above classification regarding nationalism is taken into 
consideration, it can be understood why the pan- movements appeared mostly in 
Central and Eastern Europe- later expanding towards the east among the Ottomans 
and Arabs- rather than in its western counterpart. As stated before, nationalism in 
Western Europe was moderate and the pressures of industrialism would be 
discharged by acquiring colonies.However, in Central Europe, there were land­
locked countries and as in the example of Germany, there was need for unification. 
In Eastern Europe, national independence was the dominant drive which would 
foster pan- nationalistic aims against imperialism.
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1.2 The definition of the Pan- movements:
In Europe, the nineteenth century has been rightly called the age of 
nationalism. Towards the end of that century and around the beginning of the 
twentieth century, in which history shifted from a European to a global basis, may 
become known as the age of pan- nationalism. (International Encyclopaedia of 
Social Sciences, 1972: 64). In fact, before the term “pan” was used, there had 
existed various ideals of unification along religious or geographic lines like the 
ideal of a "Christian Commonwealth" in the Middle Ages. There were attempts 
repeatedly to unite all the Christian world which would combine them in a secular- 
religious state as a successor to the Roman Empire. In the later Middle Ages, this 
kind of a commonwealth supported by Rome began to lose its impetus. It began to 
collide with national ambitions. The result was the break- up of the medieval 
polity and the rise of national states. This ideal gave way to the Renaissance of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and to the Age of Reason in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The drama of the French Revolution signalled the end of 
medievalism and the idea of Christian Commonwealth. Another example is the 
idea of "Dar-iil-Islam" ( the home of all muslims) of the Muslims. According to 
Islamic Law, the lands that are governed in accordance with the Islaimc rules and 
where the authority of the caliphate is accepted, are considered as the lands of 
Islam. The lands that reject Islamic sovereignty turned to be the land of war ( 
Dar'iil Harb).
A pan- movement can be defined as dedication to the unification of a 
geographic area, linguistic group, nation, race or religion (Kazemzadeh, 1968: 
365). According to Snyder, (1990: 305) 'the grouping together of and organized 
activities by a people working concertedly to enhance and promote their solidarity,
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and bound together by a common kindred language, the same historical traditions, 
and/ or geographical proximity' is the viable definition of a pan- movement. He 
also states that, (1990: 304) in such a movement, the "we group" sees its unity as 
including all those who "should" belong to the Fatherland or Motherland. The pan­
movements grouped together all those holding a similar national sentiment and 
who believed that they belonged together. More specifically, their main aim was 
to promote the solidarity or union of groups physically in different states, but 
bound to each other by a common language, race, tradition or religion.
Synder considers pan- movements as macro nationalisms. He identifies 
macro nationalism as " attempts to extend existing nationalisms based on common 
language, customs, traditions, history, psychological characteristics, and, on 
occasion, religion.” (1990: 200). He considers them as the extension of existing 
nationalisms. On the other hand, Keddie (1966: 17-28) considers pan- movements 
as "nationalisms before nationalisms" which meant that they had many common 
characteristics of the later nationalisms appearing on the national level.
1.3 Some common characteristics of the pan- movements:
Though it may not be so definite, it is possible to find some common 
features regarding these pan- movements. According to Landau, these similarities 
are as follows (1995: 182-89):
First, they mostly aim at the revival of an ancient culture in search for 
common roots. Secondly, they usually have an organization whether small or 
varied in membership, influencial or ineffective, with or without a governing body. 
Their form of organization determined their success to the extent that they 
appealed to their people. Thirdly- pan- movements increase their activities during 
war, because there is a higher possibility for change in political borders that may
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well fit their desire for cross- territorial expansion. Another striking point is that 
they were often led by intellectuals enforcing the cultural dimensions and finding 
expression throughout these people's writings or published newspapers. 
Generally, the first stages of these movements were cultural and if the adherents 
were to establish a strong type of organization, turned to be political or militant. It 
is also not difficult to point out that, when through time or under some 
indispensable circumstances they were led by different states and thus underwent 
some transmission in terms of their ideology, expression, methods or 
interpretation. Except Pan- Americanism , they were not able to find strong 
support by the governments and never achieved to establish a political party. They 
only maintained some supporters among the political parties, but their influence on 
governments was limited. They were most of the time a reaction against some 
imperialistic aims and their forced policies to colonization. Finally, pan­
movements have been distinguished by a conscious or unconscious sense of 
superiority and their advocates saw themselves chosen by destiny to assume a high 
place in the society of nations.
1.4 Classification of the pan- movements;
There is a clear classification by Landau (1995: 180-1) that must be stated 
here. He makes two distinct parts when comparing the various pan- movements. 
He states the first group of the pan- movements as those aimed at forming a 
common policy and a second group targeted political union with a militantly 
nationalistic character. He further divides the latter into two sub- categories. The 
first one is ideology, aimed at the unification of independent states with common 
traditions and interests. The second type is an irredentist one, which he considers 
as an extension of nationalism. This type is characterised by the desire of a state,
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whose political frontiers do not consist of all of the members of the same cultural 
or ethnic group, to include minorities of other countries having a common tie with 
the 'mother- country'. He gives Pan- Americanism and Pan- Africanism as 
examples for the first group. For the second group under the first sub- category, 
examples are Pan- Arabism, Pan- Europanism and Pan- Islamism. And the rest, 
Pan- Turkism, Russian Pan- Slavism, Pan- Germanism fall under the second sub­
category.
Another classification is made by Snyder (1990: 305). In the first type of 
pan- movements, some assume that they possess a common racial or ethnic 
identity. For the second type, there is an emphasis on the idea of a traditional 
culture rooted in the past. Historians, poets and novelists seek some common 
elements in the past. Still other pan- movements direct their attention to religious 
forms- they see primacy in the need to combine peoples of one religion into a 
supranational state. Another type of pan- movement is geographically oriented and 
continental in scope.
1.5 Pan- movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
It is necessary to focus on these pan-movements seperately, which appeared 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieeth centuries in order to better understand 
their diverse aims, forms of organization, methods and ideologies. This is also 
necessary to reflect syncranisation in history. In this respect, Pan- Arabism, Pan- 
Germanism, Pan- Islamism, Pan- Scandinavianism, Pan- Slavism and Pan- 
Turkism will be considered together. Pan- Americanism will not be taken into 
account as it occured in another continent. Hence, it is not an ingridient among 
other pan-isms that occured in Europe, which directly influenced one another,
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especially Pan- Turkism, which will be the significant one for the purpose of this 
study. Likewise, Pan- Africanism and Pan- Iranianism will be excluded as they 
belong to the second half of the twentieth century.
1.5.1 Patı- Arabism:
Pan- Arabism, the idea that all Arabs could and must be united in a single 
state, was closely related to Pan- Islamism as in the case of Pan- Turkism. It was 
influenced both by Jamal- al Din al- Afghani and Egyptian intellectuals such as 
Mustafa Kamil and Saad Zaghlul. It was also influenced by Western nationalism 
and in asmuch as the Arabs chose a European model, it was the unifications of 
Germany and Italy. Its main opponent was the Ottoman Empire as the Arabs 
believed that they had been assimilated by the Ottoman rule. Pan- Arabism failed 
to become a popular movement. Its potential impact was broken by the diversity of 
the Arab world, the rapid growth of nationalism in Egypt and the disparity in 
cultural, economic, and political levels between various Arab states.
1.5.2 Pan- Germanism:
Pan- Germanism was a political movement which confined its acivities to 
one nationality- the German- and was very well organized. Its goal had been the 
unification of all people speaking German or a Germanic language. The movement 
had its roots in the desire for German unification, stimulated by the war of 
liberation (1813-15) against Napoleon I and fanned by early German nationalists. 
The movement was organized in 1894, when Ernest Hasse, a professor in Leipzig 
set up the Pan- German League which can be considered as the heart and soul of 
the movement. Membership was open to every German regardless of citizenship
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and they were drawn largely from the middle classes. It consisted of local branches 
and district organizations subordinate to an executive council, which determined 
policy, amended the league's constitution and elected the executive and business­
managing committees. Since the League had official spokesmen and a central 
organization, they were able to formally state their purposes on many occasions.
It was the task of the league to arouse patriotism through propoganda and 
indoctrinate the masses in "hundred-per-cent Germanism", in hatred of Poles, Jews 
or any foreigners. At its 1898 Convention, the league proclaimed 26 aims, among 
them the major ones were employment of only German labour in imperial and 
state domains, prohibition of immigration of 'less worthy elements', prohibition of 
the use of foreign languages in meetings and clubs.
The league's ideology was too radical. It was a mixture of colonialism, 
militarism, navalism, anti- Slavism and antisocialism and thus only a few thousand 
were capable of accepting this (Encyclopadeia of Britannica, 1995:Vol 9, 103). 
Nevertheless, the league helped systemitize all these ideas and they were later 
taken by the extremists, Hitler being among them.
1.5.3 Pan- Islcanism:
It is a movement to promote the unification of all Muslims throughout the 
world regardless of nationality. The inability of the Muslim states to withstand the 
pressure of European imperialism gave rise to Pan- Islamism. Its founder and 
ideologist was Jamal- al-Din al-Afghani who was a great intellectual and lived in 
Iran, Afghanistan,India, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire respectively. He published 
a newspaper that called for the union of Muslim peoples and states against 
Western aggression and domination. He hoped to utilize the caliphate for Muslim
14
unification and attempted to win the support of the Ottoman Sultan Abdiilhamid II, 
who then favoured the ideology as a means of strengthening his own hold over the 
Ottoman Empire. But more strongly, it penetrated the minds of a number of 
younger bureaucrats and soldiers (some of the pioneers of the Committee of Union 
and Progress) in the Ottoman capital.
Pan- Islamism never developed a strong organization perhaps because of 
Jamal al-Din's clericel followers were not fit to lead a political movement, and thus 
it was a projection of his ideas and personality. It can be considered as an utopian 
ideology because, at various times, it presupposed some premises like the need for 
a strong central authority to lead and impose its ideology vested in the Caliph; the 
rallying of the entire Muslim world to the cause, the obedience of Muslims 
eveywhere to the Caliph, total solidarity even at the risk of sacrificing local 
interests, readiness for common action (in the Holy War, Jihad). Finally, it is 
important to note that it is unique because it based itself strictly on religious 
commonality.
1.5.4 Pan- Scandinaviansm:
Pan- Scandinavianism was a nineteenth century movement aimed at 
achieveing the unity of the Scandinavian people. It attracted many supporters 
especially during its struggle regarding the “Schleswig- Holstein” problem. Like 
the emergence of other pan- movements in Europe and Asia, the research that had 
been carried out in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on philology and 
archaeology brought about its birth., The movement further developed against the 
rise of Pan- Germanism and Russian expansionaism. Its basic aim was to promote 
cultural and political unity among Scandinavian peoples and reached its peak
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especially between 1845 and 1864, mostly supported by the middle class people 
and students. The Norwegian and Swedish supporters of the movement, which 
opposed Pan- Germanism regarding the Schlesweig- Holstein problem, fought as 
volunteers on the side of Denmark during the War of Schlesweig (1848- 1850). 
However, because of a disagreement about the same problem between the two 
groups, they did not take sides on behalf of Denmark in the second war that took 
place in 1864. This resulted in the weakening of the movement. After that time, it 
only became influential among the Swedish minority living in Finland.
1.5.5 Pan- Slavism:
Pan- Slavism recognized a common ethnic background among the various 
Slav peoples of Eastern and East Central Europe, like Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, 
Croats and Bulgars and sought to unite those peoples for the achievement of 
common cultural and political goals. The movement was originally founded by the 
west and south Slav intellectuals, scholars and poets, whose peoples were 
dominated politically by the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires at that time and 
were developing a sense of national identity
Revolutionary activities throughout Europe in 1848 gave political impetus to 
this largely philosophical and literary movement. A Pan- Slav Congress was 
convened in Prague in 1848 at which the various Slavic peoples with diverse 
interests came together. Austrian Slavs tended to be loyal to the Habsburgs, the 
Poles saw their principal enemy in Russia, while the Serbs and the Bulgars looked 
to Russia for overthrowing Ottoman domination. So, the Congress ended in 
complete disagreement and Pan- Slavism remained a philosophical- literary
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movement until it entered its Russian phase in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
The Russian Panslavist ideology rested on Slavophilism which has a premise 
that Europe was divided into two incompatible "worlds" : the Romano- Germanic 
and the Greco- Slavic ( Petrovich, 1985: 35). As a part of Greco- Slavic world, 
their main claim was that Russia possessed a stronger independent culture to fulfill 
a universal role than the culture of the West. When efforts were made by the 
Russians in the early twentieth century to call new Pan- Slav congresses and revive 
the movement, nationalistic rivalries among the various Slav peoples prevented 
their effective collaboration.
In other words, Pan- Slavism had two distint stages. The nonpolitical and 
cultural one was taken up by the Czech and Slovak intellectuals, and the political 
one by the Russians. It never developed as a unified organization and was unable 
to create a mass movement anywhere.
1.5.6 Pan- Turkism:
The guiding objective of this movement was to call for some sort of a 
cultural or physical union among all peoples of Turkic origins whether living both 
within or outside the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. It was first bom among the 
Tatars of Crimea who were influenced by Pan- Islamism and was a reaction 
against Russian nationalism. However, Pan- Slavism was taken as the intellectual 
model for them. The younger generation of Tatar intellectuals further secularized 
Pan- Turkism, and thus they emphasized Turkic nationalism and racism and also a 
break with Pan- Islam.
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In the years between 1905- 1908, the movement was able to express itself 
through its press and several Muslim congresses. It was again during these years 
that several Pan- Turkist leaders were driven out of Russia because of the 
restoration of Russian absolutism. Most of them came to the Ottoman capital 
where they largely influenced a number of Young Turks. Before the beginning of 
World War I, the Pan- Turkists talked of an empire streching from the 
Mediterranean to the Pacific.
Regarding its organization, it has been a small one led by intellectuals and 
supported by middle- class town people and students. Thus, the Pan- Turkists 
were never able to establish the significant mass movement to which they aspired.
There were some other pan- movements like Pan- Africanism which called 
for a unity among African states, Pan- Arabism closely related to Pan- Islamism 
and was broken by the diversity of the Arab world, Pan- Europanism as founded in 
the Hague in 1948, Pan- Iranism against the Turkification process by the Ottoman 
Empire. They are worth mentioning at this point because they did not belong to the 
nineteenth century and were rather a product of the twentieth century where they 
arose in a different environment, thus in these terms they differed from the above 
mentioned pan- movements.
1.6 Interaction between the pan movements:
There was apparently some relationship among several pan- ideologies and 
movements. Pan- Arabism was a consequence of the forced turkification 
introduced by the Pan- Turk leadership of the Ottoman Empire. Pan- Turkism was 
a reaction against Pan- Slavism under which its defined territories acquired a great 
number of people of Turkic origin. It later provided the Ottoman Empire with a
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weapon against its old enemy the Czarist Russia during World War I, just as 
Russians had earlier employed Pan- Slavism against the Ottoman Empire and 
Austria- Hungary. Russian Pan- Slavism had clearly expressed the Romano- 
Germanic "world" as its enemy under the ideology of Slavophilism and dedicated 
itself to a universal role for transcending the human will. Pan- Germanism was 
used in order to gain advantage over rivals in the European balance of power. 
Germans also used Pan- Islam on the Caucasus front in order to outflank Russians 
who were threatening them. (Paksoy, 1989: 10) Pan- Islamism at its later stage in 
the twentieth century, although explicitly defined in religious terms, directed its 
actions against the European powers. The Balkan War of 1912, further fostered the 
idea of uniting all Muslims in a common defensive struggle against European 
attacks. Islam had been stirred by religious reform movements; revolts broke out 
as far as China and the Dutch East Indies where Mahdist fanaticism flared up 
among the people. (Kohn, 1929, 38) Pan- Scandinavianism was spurred by the rise 
of Pan- Germanism and by a general fear of Russian expansion.
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CHAPTER II
COMPETING IDEOLOGIES IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD
During the last third of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth, three major ideologies competed with one another in the Ottoman 
Empire. They fell into three groups, each group seeking to define the position of 
the empire not only in dealing with the changing external political conjuncture 
with two opposite camps arising but also, in more fundamental terms, terms that 
involved the very existence and future destinies of the Turkish nation. The first 
group was Ottomanists who favored advocating equality of oppurtunities for all 
subjects of the empire, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, in order to ensure 
their loyalty. The second group was the Pan- Islamists who favoured Islam and 
the Muslims at the expense of other religions. Finally, there were the Pan- Turkists 
who emphasized primordial Turkish values and campained for an alliance of all 
Turkish/ Turkic groups, within the empire and outside it.
2.1 Pan- Turkism- The Ideology;
As common in many of the pan-movements, Pan-Turkism had cultural and 
political dimensions. It is nearly impossible to evaluate the success of cultural Pan- 
Turkism as it lasted over a century and appeared in a vast territory. More emphasis
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will be given to the political dimension as it is less difficult to identify and will be 
more helpful to support the arguments in the preceding chapters.
2.1.1 The Political Dimension:
To begin with, it is crucial to state that there is a clear distinction between 
Pan- Turkism and Turanism. There appeared a mistaken interpretation that they 
were the same as most of the Pan- Turkist writers adopted the term "Turan" into 
their writings, to signify the Turkish homeland.
Turanism's main objective was to unite all peoples whose origins are 
purported to extend back to Turan, an undefined Shangri- La- like area in the 
steppes of central Asia. Turan was variously identified with Turkestan, Tatarstan, 
Uzbekistan and Moghulistan, according to its ruling inhabitants at different times. 
Its limits were given as China in the east, Tibet, India and Iran in the south, the 
desert of Dasht-i Kipchak and the Caspian Sea in the west and, again, the desert of 
Dasht-i Kipchak in the north. (Landau, 1995:23). According to the Geographical 
section of the Naval Intelligence Division of England, (1920: 12) the term "Turan" 
was first used by the Persian poet Firdusi in his "Shahname" or "Book of Kings", 
(composed about A.D 1000). It refers to the area beyond north and east of Oxus 
(Amu Derya) as opposed to Iran or Persia. So, Turanism has been a far broader 
concept than Pan- Turkism, embracing such peoples as the Hungarians, Finns and 
Estonians.
In addition to this, Turanism was more linguistic- minded than Pan- 
Turkism. (Synder: 1990: 315) According to Turanians, Turkish languauge would 
be purified and Persian and Arabic words should be deleted. Yet another 
distinction- basically ideological- was in terms of their perception of Islam.
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Turanians claimed that Islam itself was far too wide a concept and religion must 
steer clear of political entanglements. On the other hand, while Pan- Turkism 
veered away from Islam, it did repeat Pan- Islamic reactions against the 
encroachments of other nationalisms.
A similar terminological mixup also appeared for Turkism and Pan- 
Turkism as they were mostly used together during the First World War. There was 
an obvious difference in scope between the two ideologies: the basic approach of 
many Turkists was that Pan- Turkism was just another ingredient in their overall 
approach to nationalism, while Pan- Turkists generally considered Turkism as a 
pillar of faith in their interpretation of a wider- embracing nationalist doctrine. 
Turkism emphasized Turkish nationalism within the Ottoman Empire and Pan- 
Turkism emphasize union ofTurks of the world. On the other hand, both Turkists 
and Pan- Turkists had very much in common , especially in their attitudes towards 
the past and their optimism towards the future. Some Turks, appraising the 
Ottoman Empire's political and military situation realistically, saw Turkism as the 
only feasible means of saving the Empire; those who dreamed of a greater future 
role for the Turks considered Pan- Turkism the key to success.
Nevertheless, these three terms were generally used with each other or 
instead of one another. In his work "Türkçülüğün Esasları" (The Principles of 
Turkism) Ziya Gökalp explains the difference between Turkism and Turanism 
(1968: 19-20). He identifies 'Turan' as the long-range ideal of Turkism and among 
three different magnitudes of it, besides Turkey- ism and Oghuzism and quite 
optimistic for the Turan ideal to become real.
Pan- Turkism can be considered as a two-pronged movement, one being 
led by the intellectuals among Turkic groups in Russia- also named as outside
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Turks- in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the other having flowered in 
the Ottoman Empire early in the tweentieth century. (Landau, 1995: 17)
Two main trends in the relations of Russian authorities with Turkic groups 
constituted the rise of the Turkist ideology in Czarist Russia. First one was the 
Russification policy which was developed by Pan- Slavism and the second was 
Christianisation. These two trends were evident attacks on the national origins and 
faith of the Turkic groups whose potential allies, in that case, lay naturally within 
the parameters of Pan- Islam or Pan-Turkism. Although Pan-Islam seemed to be 
more available and convenient as Sultan Abdulhamid II was partial to this 
ideology, the development of nationalism in Southeastern Europe fostered Pan- 
Turkism instead.
The main group, who took the lead in initiating and propogating Pan- 
Turkism, was the Crimean Tatars. (Landau, 1995:7) This was due to many 
reasons. First of all, they were the very group which had been longest under 
Russian rule and therefore they heavily felt Russian pressures accompanying 
Christinisation and Russification. Secondly, geographically they lived very close 
to the Ottoman Empire, and thus they were influenced by the political changes that 
occur in the empire. Thirdly, they were surrounded by non-Tatars, constituting a 
great threat, and unity with other Turkic groups was their only hope for survival. 
Lastly, since the end of the seventeenth century a large and active bourgeoisie who 
were capable of leading a nationalist awakening had been developing and were 
engaged in commercial rivalry with the Russians, hence Pan-Turkism provided a 
convenient ideological basis.
The key figure in this revival was Ismail Gasprinsky- also known by his 
Turkish name, Gaspirah- who was most active in education, journalism and
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language reform. Despite its primarily cultural nature, Gasprinsky's impact laid the 
groundwork for political Pan- Turkism of an irredentist type. Three all- Muslim 
congresses met at Nidzhni- Novgorod in August 1905, St. Petersburg in January 
1906, and near Nidzhni- Novgorod in 1906 which were all predominated by 
political demands with clear Pan- Turk elements. Tatars were in a definite majority 
at all three congresses. Subsequently, in 1907, Ali Hüseyinzade, a Caucasus Tatar, 
defined the objectives of Turkic nationalism in his journal Fiiyuzat 
('Enlightenment') as 'Turkism, Islamism and Europeanisin' with the first element 
considered as the most important. Another Tatar, Yusuf Akçura, or Akçuraoğlu 
was even more explicit. He had determined the bases for political Pan- Turkism in 
his article entitled "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset" (Three Systems of Government). He 
emphasized Turkism as the only realistic means of effecting a national union of all 
Turks, with Turkey at its center. For the first time, Pan- Turkism was preached as a 
political doctrine and was suggested as the only viable category of nationalism 
capable of saving the Ottoman Empire.
During the First World War, antigovernmental activities by the Turkic 
groups in Czarist Russia and their continued resistance to the Soviet rule during 
the first decade of the new regime was a result of their nationalist Pan- Turkist 
character. However as the Soviets pitted minority groups against one another and 
set up autonomous subdistricts emphasizing the small ethnocultural subdivions 
among Turkic groups, active Pan- Turkism was relegated to isolated cases alone.
The center of political Pan- Turk activity had moved, even during First 
World War, to the Ottoman Empire. Leading Tatars, like Hüseyinzade and Akçura 
and Azeri journalist Ahmet Agayev (Ağaoğlu), all of whom had displayed marked 
interest in Pan- Turkism, left Russia and settled in İstanbul. There, they
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contributed their share to the public debate on the nature and fortunes of Turkish 
nationalism. Prominent among the Ottoman intellectuals then busily engaged in 
the debate were Ziya Gökalp and Tekin Alp.
Gökalp may be credited with systematizing the Turkish thinking on Pan- 
Turkism and using his prestige to encourage its consideration and acceptance as a 
point of departure for public debate. Tekin Alp, in his work "Türkler Bu Savaşta 
Ne Kazanabilirler" (What can the Turks Gain in This War?), argued that the new 
Turkish nationalism, or Turkism, could be equated with its strongest component, 
Pan- Turkism. He called on the movement to become as irredentist as its Italian or 
Romanian counterparts and wished it a large measure of success (Landau, 1984: 
32). This appears to be the first explicit public appeal in the Ottoman Empire for 
an irredentist, politically minded Pan- Turkism.
With the contributions of these intellectuals, Pan- Turk ideology was 
adopted by several top political leaders and became the official ideology of the 
Ottoman Empire for a while. Its appeal in the CUP increased especially after the 
1908 revolt and Pan- Turk propoganda campaigns were conducted by the 
committee's agents in Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Türkistan, Iran and Afghanistan , 
as well as among the Volga Tatars. The main proponent of the Committee's Pan- 
Turk policies was Enver Pasha, who is going to be the focus of this study and the 
ideology's flowering in the Committee will be analyzed further in other chapters 
with special emphasis on Enver Pasha and his lifetime activities devoted to the 
ideology of Pan- Turkism.
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2.1.2 The Cultural Dimension:
As stated earlier, Pan- Turkism first appeared on cultural grounds and was 
led by intellectuals who sought to rediscover and reassert their own culture, which 
was suitable for creating a nation of all the fellow- nationals and differentiating 
them from others. For many of them, the existence of a "common language" 
served as a sufficient proof for constituting a lingustic group.
Ismail Gasprinsky was most active in education, journalism and language 
reform. By 1883, he had already founded a newspaper, the Tercüman ( 
'Interpreter') in which he advocated secular nationalism with a definite Pan- Turk 
cultural inclination. He also devised a lingua franca for Turkish groups in Russia 
and abroad. He worked to purify the Turkish language from foreign words and 
eliminate the differences between Turkish languages and dialects that contained 
variations in vocabulary. The theme of language reform was also taken up by local 
newspapers in Azerbaijan and Bukhara. No fewer than 250 newspapers were 
published by Turkic groups between 1905 and 1917 (Georgeon: 1999: 55).
In the Ottoman Empire, the writings of many Ottoman thinkers contributed 
to the rise of Pan- Turkism. Among them Ziya Gökap's writings were of great 
significance. In his work Türkçülüğün Esasları (The Principles of Turkism) he 
wrote a part on “Linguistic Turkism” (1968: 76-94) and argued about which 
dialect to choose as the national language. He also identified Turanism and stated 
that: " Turan is the great fatherland of all Turks, which was a reality in the past and 
may be so again in the future". (1968: 20) Among his poems, "Turan" referes to a 
huge undefined land in Central Asia, the common birthplace of all Turkic groups. 
Similarly, Tekin Alp argued for Pan- Turkism in his articles and books and was
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largely respnsible for European perceptions of Pan- Turkism as some of his works 
were translated into German, English and French.
Regarding the cultural dimension, the matter of common origins and ethnic 
bonds were also pronounced by intellectuals. In Ömer Seyfeddin's writing Milli 
Tecrübelerden Çıkartılmış Ameli Siyaset ( Practical politics/ policy deriving from 
national experiences), his theory was that in the Ottoman Empire there lived at 
least 30 million people: 16 million Turks, 9 million Arabs, 1,5 million Greeks, 1,5 
million Armenians and fewer than 500.000 Jews. He opted for the progress of both 
Turks and Arabs, two groups of the same faith with no essential conflicts. He felt 
that the Turks ought to learn from past experiences and adopt only a Turkish/ 
Islamic policy. Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, collected his poems under the name 
Turana Doğru ( Towards Turan), which stirred up the reader's patriotic sentiments 
and awakened his pride in his own race.
Following the Young Turk Revolution, the new regime allowed Pan- Turkist 
organisation and subsequently favored it. The various associations established at 
that time, the first one being Türk Demeği (The Association of Turks) was set up 
in December 1908. Its statutes, Türk Derneği Nizamnamesi (The Statue of the 
Association of Turks), stated that the Association intended to concentrate on 
scholarship alone. It specified the Turkish studies planned as: to study all the 
written works and activities of the Turkish peoples in archeology, history, 
linguistics, literature, ethnography, ethnology, sociology, civilisation and the old 
and new geography of Turkish lands. Also some other associations were 
established like Türk Bilgi Demeği (Association for Turkish Knowledge), Türk 
Yurdu (The Homeland of the Turks) and Türk Ocağı (Hearth of the Turks) which 
Enver Pasha decided to improve organisationally and use politically. Its statutes
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defined the organization's objectives as "Working for the national education of the 
Turkish people and raising its intellectual, social and economic level, for the 
perfection of the Turkish language and race." (Ak<?ura: 1978: 214-15). It strove to 
educate the people in a nationalistic spirit and teach them to esteem their cultural 
heritage. Gokalp, being one of the leading member of the association, perceived 
elites responsible for this mission and stated that "Intellectals and and thinkers of a 
nation must go to the people" (1968: 34)
As a result, it can be said that one of the most important aims of Pan- 
Turkists was to revive the ancient culture that would be proof of a joint heritage 
different from and at least equal to those of other cultures and for this reason 
language, history and literature constituted the three interconnected pivots of 
intellectual discourse.
2.1.3 Pcin-Turkism as cm irredentist phenomenon:
The term irredentism, derived from the Italian 'terra irredenta' , meaning 
unredeemed land, was first used to refer to an Italian political movement of the late 
nineteenth century, but has come to be a general label for a common political 
manifestation (Dictionary of Politics, 1986: 164). The French policy of revanche, 
the retaking of the territories of Alsace and Lorraine lost in the Franco- Prussian 
war and Hitler's demands for the Third Reich to control German- speaking 
Czechoslovakia could be described as 'irredentist'.
There are limited or broader definitions for irredentism. Chazan (1991:140) 
defines it as "a particular facet of nationalism, where a national movement that is a 
minority in a given territory seeks to rejoin the mother country" or "an attempt 
made by an existing state to redeem territories and peoples it considers its own".
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Horowitz (1991:10) defined irredentism in a broader sense. He argued that 
irredentism contains two subtypes: "the attempt to detach land and people from 
one state in order to corporate them in another and the attempt to detach land and 
people divided among more than one state in order to corporate them in a single 
new state". An even broader definition was suggested by Landau (1995:180): " an 
ideological or organizational expression of passionate interest in the well- being of 
an ethnic or cultural minority living outside the boundaries of the states inhabited 
by the same group". He also examines, as a special type of irredentism, the pan­
ideologies and movements.
The expression of Pan-Turkism and its several features contains a tentative 
typology of irredentism (Landau, 1995: 180-191). First of all, pan- Turk ideology 
originated in the diaspora (Czarist Russia)- although there were various opinions 
as to precisely which land its exponents wished to redeem- and was propounded in 
the home country (the Ottoman Empire, then the Republic of Turkey) only later.
Secondly, the inception of Pan-Turkism appeared on the cultural plane. The 
irredentist element surfaced only later when political considerations set in, while 
research and literary works began discussing "liberation" of the "Outside Turks" 
and annexation of their territories. The trend was frequently from the moderate to 
the extreme.
Thirdly, Pan- Turkism can be considered as emotional and romantic, 
however, it is not irrational. Pan-Turkism is largely motivated by cultural, ethnic 
and political considerations. It has tended to ignore: (1) geographical factors, (2) 
military situations (the might of the Soviet Union has not deterred Pan-Turkism in 
Turkey), (3) economic considerations (raised rarely and hold the argument that it 
should not constitute a motivation for nationalism), (4) religious matters (careful
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not to antagonize Muslim sentiment, Pan- Turkists perceived that only a secular 
movement might avoid taking sides in the Sunnite- Shiite rivalry within the Turkic 
groups).
Fourthly, Pan- Turk irredentism has consistently maintained a "villain 
image" of its principal opponent, that is, the factor responsible for subjugating 
'Outside Turks' and their territories, which may comprise one or more states or 
peoples. Initially it was Czarist Russia, and to a lesser degree, China; then the 
Soviet Union and to a lesser degree, Iraq and Iran.
Fifthly, the main weakness of irredentist Pan- Turkism has been 
organization. Although there is no available data regarding the size and 
composition of its membership, its size has been modest, probably at most times 
several hundred to a few thousand members, except during First World War.
Finally, Pan- Turkism evidently failed to achieve its goals due to a variety 
of internal and external reasons. Regarding the internal reasons, they were poor 
organization; limited public support; an ideology phrased in too elaborate terms, 
and the inability to mobilize government support and commitment ( in the only 
instance, in which Pan- Turkism did find favor with the state leadership, during 
First World War, this leadership allied itself with the losing side). The relatively 
greater power of some of Turkey's neighbours, chiefly the Soviet Union and the 
particular makeup of Turkic groups abroad (where they are dispersed among other 
ethnic minorities, often at great distance from one another) were the main external 
reasons.
Irredentism merits special consideration as a vital component of Pan- 
Turkism and has been the main element differentiating it from the Turkish 
nationalism. Conflict between the views espoused by a pan- nationalism-
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particularly of an irredentist category- and those of a local, patriotic type is often 
unavoidable. Kemalism had not only displaced Pan- Turkism as the official state 
ideology, it also focused on the nation- state's narrower interests, renouncing the 
overriding concern for “Outside Turks” which had been the core of Pan- Turkism 
(Georgeon, 1999: 113). Under Mustafa Kemal's firm guidance, Turkey, although 
possessing its own brand of nationalism, sought to join other nations on an equal 
basis in the mainstream of world civilizations. Pan- Turkists, on the other hand, 
emphasised the special attributes of all Turks, with a view to uniting them, 
demonstrating much less concern for modernisation and the place of Turkey in 
those elements. As a tactical move, the Pan- Turkists explained that there was no 
real conflict between these two approaches to nationalism; and that on the contrary 
their own policies were bound to serve the interests of the nation- state admirably. 
But Kemalists were not convinced by the ideas and activities of Pan- Turkists.
2.2 Pan- Islamism- The Ideology:
The second competing ideology at the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieeth centuries in the Ottoman Empire was Pan- Islamism which was also 
exported from the outside. Political and cultural dimensions have to be mentioned 
in order to understand its dynamics.
2.2.1 The Political Dimension:
As stated earlier, the chief ideologist of the movement was Jamal ad- Din 
Afghani who emphasized the revival of the Islamic civilization opposed to 
European domination. In 1892, he was invited to settle in Istanbul on a lifelong 
pension as a guest of Sultan Abdulhamid II, who also seemed to be the ideal
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promoter of Pan- Islamism. Jamal ad- Din was kept under what amounted to house 
arrest in Constantinople. He lived there until his death in 1897.
If Jamal ad- Din was the intellectual leader of Pan- Islamism, its first patron 
was the Sultan- Caliph Abdulhamid II. He proclaimed himself as the defender of 
the Islamic social system against western imperialism, especially against the 
British in the Near East and the French in Morocco. Pan- Islamic propoganda was 
borne into all lands from Abdulhamid's court. Besides, the German Emperor 
William II encouraged the Sultan to make use of his ancient title of caliph to 
counter British power in India. His emissaries reached Java and Russia and 
Tunisia. Frequently the claims of the Caliph, as the supreme protector of Islam and 
lord of all believers, were successfully asserted. The refugees from Russia, the 
Balkans and other Muslim countries gathered in great numbers in Istanbul.
The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 put an end to the regime of 
Abdulhamid and brought about a serious setback regarding Pan- Islamic activities. 
The new government did not give priority to Pan- Islamism as much as 
Abdulhamid's era. However, they did not refrain from emphasizing Pan- Islamic 
sentiments completely. Landau (1990: 87) states four reasons for such an act. First 
of all, as in the case of Pan- Turkism, Muslims who had emigrated from Russia to 
the Ottoman Empire influenced the perception of the Committee's leaders about 
Pan- Islamism. Secondly, as the Committee moved its central committee from 
Salonica to Istanbul, they needed there the support of the Ottoman corporations 
which required religious sentiments in political thinking. Thirdly, Pan- Islamism 
was an expansionist policy which fit their desire to return to the previous borders. 
Finally, like Abdulhamid II, they used it to put pressure on Great Britain and
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France. The CUP's commitment to Pan- Islam was a matter of political 
expediency.
Just before World War I, the Committee took more aggressive Pan- Islamic 
actions. In 1910, an association named "ittihad-i /5/a/w"(Islamic Unity) was 
established in Iran with the encouragement of the Committee. In 1913, they funded 
a Pan- Islamic League in Istanbul. The significance of the ideology further 
increased with the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I. The empire's 
proclamation of war on Russia was due to the Young Turk leaders' consideration 
of liberating the Muslims outside the empire's borders. Hence, the Entente powers 
ruled over tens of millions of Muslims, which constituted a reason for the 
Committee, to enter the war on the side of the Central powers. Besides, the 
common interest of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire was to eliminate 
Russia from the Balkan and Middle Eastern affairs.
However, as World War I ended with the victory of the Entente powers, this 
marked the end of Pan- Islamic activities in the Ottoman Empire and the ideology's 
impact moved eastwards, rising in India.
2.2.2 The Cultural Dimension:
As also common in the other pan- movements, the cultural dimension of 
Pan- Islamism went hand in hand with its political activities. Its intellectual 
philosopher, Jamal ad- Din Afghani, became the leading propagandist of it. In 
addition to his various articles, he published an anti- British newspaper called "The 
Indissoluble Link" in 1884, in which he called for the unity of all Islaimc peoples 
and states against Western domination. He was in favour of introducing more 
liberal regimes into the Muslim countries in order to resist European aggression.
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Muhammed Abduh, who was Afghani's collaborator, was another contributor 
especially in the teaching and interpretation of Islam. In his articles, he mentioned 
the importance of the improvement of religious Pan-Islam, within the framework 
of Islamic religious and social reforms.
In the Ottoman Empire, the press served as the main means of Pan- Islamic 
propoganda. “Basiret ” was one of the most widely read Turkish newspapers in 
Istanbul, asserting the unity of Islam in the world. During the early years of 
Abdulhamid's reign, the newspaper "Osmanli" (The Ottoman)asserted that it was 
aiming at defending the fatherland, family and religion. Ahmed Midhat- a well- 
known man of letters and lecturer in history at Istanbul University- and, Mehmed 
Tahir- a famous calligrapher- also mentioned Islamic unity as the only means for 
saving the empire. Edited by Tahir, the newspaper "Malumat"(The Information) 
initiated a campaign against the European powers among the Muslims, praising 
Abdulhamid as the successor of the Prophet Muhammed and the Protector of all 
Muslims after the 1897 Turco- Greek War.
Another important figure was Namık Kemal who viewed Pan- Islam as a 
mainly cultural phenomenon. He expressed his opinions in the article entitled 
"htihad-i Islam "(Islamic Unity) in the Istanbul daily newspaper "ibret"(The 
Warning) in 1872. He maintained that 100- 200 million Muslims with a common 
religion and culture constituted a great force which should unite for the sake of 
protecting their Muslim identity against the Christians.
During the Young Turk period, there were some short- lived periodicals 
devoted to Pan- Islam such as the weekly "Sırat-ı Müstakim"(The Straight Way) 
and "Sebilim- Re.şad"(The Right Way). Mehmed Akif Ersoy and Esref Edib were 
the editors of these periodicals. Ahmed Hilmi, Celal Nuri İleri, Ziya Gokalp,
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Suleyman Nazif, Said Halim Pasha were the other Ottoman writers who 
emphasized Pan- Islamist sentiments in their articles.
2.3 Ottomanism:
As the third ideology, Ottomanism also found support by the middle of the 
nighteenth century onwards in the Otoman Empire. Different from Pan- Turkism 
and Pan- Islamism, which contained seperatist tendencies in order to achieve 
unification, it was a defensive ideology and perhaps the last chance to recover the 
empire which was described by Western powers as the "Sick Man". It is also the 
only ideology, which is not exported from the outside, rather it is flowered within 
the Ottoman Empire.
2.3.1 The Political Dimension:
Snyder (1990: 306) considers Ottomanism as a pan- movement and names it 
Pan- Ottomanism. This would not be a proper argument as Ottomanism does not 
contain the very basic characterstics of a pan- movement. It was only a hopeless 
effort to reach the physical boundries that the Ottoman Empire had at the end of 
the sixteenth century. In Akkra's words, this is very obvious: "The desire to bring 
into an Ottoman nation did not aim at a lofty objective nor high hopes"... (Paksoy, 
1992: 160). The ultimate result of all these dificult processes was to be the 
preservation of the "High Ottoman State" in its original external form, that is 
within its old boundries.'
On the one hand, Ottomanism was an attempt to unite all the peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire into one supra- Ottoman nationality. On the other hand, its real 
purpose was to realize perfect equality between the Muslim and the non- Muslim
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peoples of the empire. In fact, the basic idea of the 1876 Constitution was 
Ottomanism. It can be easily considered as a natural outcome in an age of 
nationalism which is dependent on the principle of consciousness rather than 
descent and ethnicity. The integration of nationalities in Europe was the major 
cause for the Ottomanists' devotion to the ideology. German unification without 
many Slavic elements; Switzerland, composed of different ethnicites and religions, 
were their major examples.
Ak?ura stated that (Paksoy, 1992: 160) Ottomanism firstly arose seriously 
during the reign of Mahmud II who was an important reformist Sultan in the effort 
for modernization of the Ottoman institutions. Midhad Pasha was to a degree a 
follower of the same ideology. Later on, in the middle of the nineteenth century, it 
became the task of the Young Ottomans to revive the Ottoman Empire. In 1865, a 
secret society "Ittifak-i Hamiyyet" ('Patriotic Alliance) was established. The 
society called for one common nationality of all those who had lived in the empire 
in the past. Its members met in London and Paris. Although their goal was clear, 
they broke into diversified units ranging from secularism to Islamic traditions, 
from conservatism to revolution, from nationalism to cosmopolitanism. Despite 
these differences, they agreed on the fiindemantal idea that the Ottoman tradition 
was a superior one.
Ali Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuat Pasha (1815-1869), who were among the 
most influential statesmen of the consitutional period, also supported this ideology. 
However, with the fall of Napoleon III who spread the idea of nationalism based 
on the French principle and consequently meant the victory of German 
interpretation of nationality; this resulted in downgrading of Ottomanism.
36
2.3.2 The Cultural Dimension:
The cultural dimension of the movement was mostly carried out by some of 
the members of the “Patriotic Alliance”. Namık Kemal, who also had Pan- Islamic 
tendencies in cultural terms, was also the most active member promoting the 
ideology. He urged all the peoples living in the territories of the old empire to be 
loyal to the Ottoman Fatherland. He believed that, indiscriminate beliefs in 
Western ways was the wrong approach because most of them were already present 
in Ottoman traditions. He called for a special constitution for the Ottoman peoples, 
a constitution that would reflect the greatness of the once powerful empire.
The other members of this group were Mehmed Bey, Nuri Bey, Reşad Bey, 
Ayetullah Bey and Refik Bey. These members all worked, in different times, at the 
Imperial Translation Breau, for this reason they were familiar with the Western 
system of political thought. Among them, Refik Bey was the owner of the "Mir'at" 
(Mirror) journal in which the translations of Montesqieu by Namık Kemal were, 
from time to time, published. Besides "Tasvir-i Efkar" (Portraiting Thoughts) was 
entrusted to Namık Kemal by Şinasi Efendi after Şinasi left the country. So, these 
two editors presented Ottomanist tendencies in their writings.
The Ottomanist notion was also used in some other journals. In "Vakit" 
(Time) journal Ottomanism was interpreted as the basic ground on which the 
Ottoman State stood.
2.4 The Clash of the three ideologies in the Ottoman Empire:
Having described the political and cultural dimensions of the three 
competing ideologies in the late Ottoman period, it is necessary to refer to Yusuf 
Akçura's famous article “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Types of Policies) written in
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the newspaper “Turk” in 1904. This article draws the picture of the period and 
presents the deficits of these three ideologies well. According to Ak?ura, (Paksoy, 
1992: 167-8) Ottomanism seemed to be impractible due to several reasons. First of 
all, Ottoman Turks themselves did not wish such a combination since such a 
policy would put an end to their six- hundred years old domination and they would 
descend to the level of equality with reaya whom they regarded as subjugated 
peoples. Secondly, Muslims would not favor it as in their beliefs the equality of 
Muslims and non- Muslims could not be acceptable. Thirdly, non- Muslims 
opposed it since this would destroy their chance to acquire sovereignty. Fourthly, 
the greatest enemy of the Ottomans, Russia did not wish it. Russia had always 
tried to get the possession of the Straits in order to expand to the south and 
challenge Britain for the control of Islamic holy lands. Finally, the idea was not 
well received in some parts of Europe as they wanted to rescue the Christians from 
Muslim yoke, following the tradition of the Crusades.
He also puts forward the deficits of Pan- Islamism. (Paksoy, 1992: 169-170) 
Such a policy would increase the existing rivalries among the peoples of the 
empire and thus result in separation of the Turks as Muslims and non- Muslims 
which would destroy the common affinity based on ethnicity. As an external 
obstacle, with one or two exceptions, all of the Muslim states were under the 
influence of the Christian states. Hence, it would take a very long time for the 
realization of Pan- lslamism. On the other hand, this policy had advantages. It 
would create an Islamic Commonwealth more solid and compact than the unity of 
the Ottoman nation. Such a unity would also help survive alongside the great 
powers arising in other parts of Europe.
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Finally, he emphasized the advantages and disadvantages of Pan- Turkism 
(Paksoy, 1992: 171-2). In terms of disadvantages, this policy would lead to the 
division of the Muslims into Turks and non- Turks. Externally, Russia would 
oppose such an ideology as this would lead to the separation of the Turkic people 
living in Russia. As an advantage, such a policy would create a greater national 
political unity among other great nations and a Turkish world would be created 
between the world of the Caucasian and the East Asian ethnicities in which the 
Ottoman state could play the major role.
At the end of his article, he stated that (Paksoy, 1992: 173), he is still not 
decided about which policy would be more practical and beneficial for the 
Ottoman state.
There is also a need to refer to H.B Paksoy's precise argument regarding 
Pan- Turkism and Pan- Islamism. (1989: 10) According to him, these two pan­
movements have no historical precedent among the Turks.They were the political 
creation of the age of European imperial expansion. He states that Pan- Turkism 
appeared in a work by Hungarian Orientalist, Arminius Vambery, who was 
working for the British government. It was created in order to encourage the Turks 
to form a buffer zone between the expanding Russian Empire and the British 
colonies for checking Russian advance towards the south. On the other side, it was 
also promoted by the Russians as a threat since they wanted to portray their 
conquests of Central Asia as belated revenge against earlier manifestations of Pan- 
Turanism such as Timur's invasion of Moscow in 1405. Likewise, despite its 
origins in the colonial world, Pan- Islamism was mostly fostered by the Germans 
who wanted to gain an advantage over their rivals in the European balance of 
power. Military action by the Ottomans would have forced the British to move
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away forces from the front where they faced the Germans. Besides, Germans also 
used it on the Caucasus front in order to outflank the Russians who were also 
constituting a great threat for them.
To summarize, Pan- Islam had hardly deterred Muslim subjects from 
striving to achieve their national aspirations and failed to recruit much Muslim 
support abroad. Moreover, Ottomanist propoganda also failed to hinder the 
nationalist- separatist activities and aspirations of such groups like Bulgarians, 
Serbs, Greeks, Armenians and others. The obvious response to separatist 
nationalism was a grand design for Turkish nationalism. As a result, after 1913, 
several of the Young Turk leaders increasingly began to support the Pan- Turk 
option.
Ahmad points out that (1995: 188) it was the Balkan Wars that gave rise to 
Pan- Turkism. As many Balkan minorities were separated from the empire, this 
weakened the idea of realization of Islamism and Ottomanism, and Pan- Turkism 
was a response to these movements. Secondly, as the Turks became the largest 
majority in the Ottoman Empire, this gave an impetus to Pan- Turkism. Thirdly as 
it was not a clearly defined ideology, it was possible to use it with Islamism. 
Finally, he points out that, like Pan- Islamism, it was an expansionist policy and 
was available to be grasped by the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress 
being a source of motivation as they lost territories in the western front. Pan- 
Islamism was used to calm down the Arabs and Ottomanism applied to neutralize 
the contradictions between the three ideologies.
Ziircher makes a similiar analysis (1995: 54) and puts the Balkan Wars as 
the core reason for the favoring of Pan- Turkism. Different from Ahmad, he states 
that, struggles with the Arab minorities had logically downgraded Pan- Islamism.
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Anday stated that (1987: 2) at no time it would be possible for the Ottoman 
peoples to gain an equal status, since in such unity Arabs were going to be the 
largest group and this would result in dissappointment among the Turkic groups. 
What is more, Europe and especially Russia would definitely oppose such an event 
due to political and religious reasons.
Only after disappointment with Ottomanism and Pan- Islamism, did the 
Young Turk leadership turn more definitely to Pan- Turkism. Pan- Turkism 
outshadowed the other two ideologies and its historic chance arrived before and 
during First World War, a feature common to many pan- movements. For a while, 
it became a guiding principle of state policy. However the Young Turk leadership 
did not discard the other policies of Ottomanism and Islamism. Rather, they 
downgraded and applied them, only intermittently, whenever occasion demanded. 
Pan- Turkism remained as the leading ideology until early days of the Kemalist 
Revolution which appeared with a new idea of a territorial nation- state based on 
the Turkish nation in Turkey, defining the borders of Turkish nationalism. The 
following words by Mustafa Kemal, in a speech delivered on December 1, 1921, 
(Lewis, 1961: 353, Soylev, 193-5,6) defines the end of the three ideologes and is 
good evidence that they had been the dominating ideologies of the previous era 
which Mustafa Kemal regarded necessary to mention in order to stress his full 
rejection:
Gentlemen we are not men who run after great fantasies 
and present a fraudulent appearance of doing things which in 
fact we cannot do... we did not serve Pan- Islamism. We said 
that we had, but we didn’t, and our enemies said: ' Let us kill 
them at once before they do!' We did not serve Pan- Turanism. 
We said that we could and we would, and again they said: ' Let 
us kill them! There you have the problem... Rather than run 
after ideas which we did not and could not realise and thus
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increase the number of our enemies and the pressure upon us, 
let us return to our natural, legitimate limits. And let us know 
our limits. Gentlemen, we are a nation desiring life and 
independence. For that and that alone may we give our lives. "
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CHAPTER IH
THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS AND THE ROLE OF 
ENVER PASHA WITHIN THE COMMITTEE:
3.1 The foundation and roots of the Committee:
The Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter, CUP) had influenced the 
political, social, economic and cultural life of its period and, in a way, determined the 
future destiny of the Ottoman Empire. The roots of the CUP's ideology can be traced 
back to the era of Tanzimat (1839-1876). Within this perspective two movements, 
the "Young Ottomans" and the "New Ottomans", can be considered as the basis of 
the CUP.
In 1865, six young people established a secret organization called "The 
Patriotic Alliance" namely Mehmed Bey, Nuri Bey, Reşad Bey, Ayetullah Bey, 
Refik Bey and Namık Kemal. Their common attitude was opposition to the policies 
of Âli and Fuat Pashas who were very active in the decision- making process of the 
Ottoman Empire. In their opinion, these pashas were making many concessions to 
the European powers and they were not successful in keeping the unity of the empire.
There is a legitimate division regarding the above mentioned movements.The 
year 1889 is considered as the turning point since the establishment of the committee
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occurred in this year, although at that time it did not adopt the name of CUP yet. 
From the European point of view, there is no such division and the pioneers of the 
movement, both active in the establishment of the First Constitution and the Second 
Constitution, are considered as the "Young Ottomans". However, Turkish historians 
usually consider the movement as "Young Ottomans" only for the period after 1889. 
Tank Zafer Tunaya makes a different argument covering both of the assumptions 
(1952: 102). He calls the period between 1865 and 1889 of the "First Young Turk 
Movement" and considers the period after 1889 as the "Second Young Turk 
Movement".
Tunaya's argument seems more acceptable as the movement took itself the 
"Young" movements in Europe as example. (Akşin, 1987: 19) In the nineteenth 
century the movements which adopted liberal and fundamentalist ideologies against 
absolutism were called "Young" throughout Europe. The most famous one was the 
"Young Italy" organization, which was founded under the leadership of Mazzini, 
aimed at the unity of Italy under a republican rule. There were also "Young Poland", 
"Young Switzerland", "Young Germany" and Young France" movements which 
were all established shortly after the 1830 Revolution. Hobsbawm claims that, (1998: 
147-8) these movements were not so affective, however, they were symbolically 
important since they directly shaped European revolutionary movements, which were 
divided into national units. According to him, all these movements shared the same 
political programs, strategies and tactics. They saw themselves as 'Messiahs' and 
believed that the opressed societies of the world, in one-way or another, would gain 
their independence at the end.
Mardin, (1996: 29-30) states that there is some evidence for the Italian impact 
on the ideology of the 'Patriotic Alliance'. For example, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, who
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was a protector and the financer of the organization, recommended the Italian King 
as the model for the Sultan. Namık Kemal shared the views of Mazzini. Ali Suavi 
was also another figure who emphasized the impacts of young movements on the 
formation of "Patriotic Alliance".
A few years later, the organization changed its name to "New Ottomans 
Organization". After 1867, they continued their activities in Europe. The leading 
members of the organization moved to Paris. Meanwhile, Ziya Bey, Sinasi, Ali 
Suavi, Agah Efendi, Rıfat Bey and Hüseyin Vasfi Pasha also joined them. However, 
after a short time, the French government took same measures against the activities 
of the organization. Then, they went to London and continued their propaganda 
through different journals.
Two important developments marked the end of the movement. First of all, 
some ideological differences arose between Ali Suavi and the others. Secondly, 
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha returned to Istanbul as he accepted the calls of the Sultan who 
forgave him. Soon after, he became the Justice Minister. Consequently, the financial 
sources of the organization were almost cut off. However, though not being so 
active, they continued their propaganda against the existing rule. As a result of 
another amnesty in 1870, they altogether returned to Istanbul. Until 1876, they 
published "Ibret"(The Warning) newspaper and in the meantime Namık Kemal's 
famous play "Fartaw"(Motherland) was staged. At the end, their efforts helped in the 
declaration of the First Constitution in 1876.
Within a decade, after the dissolution of the parliament in 1877, the 
revolutionary movements slowed down their activities because of the despotic rule of 
Abdulhamid II. The major awakening happened in 1889 with the establishment of 
the organization, which was later going to adopt the name Committee of Union and
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Progress. At that time, the secret organization, which was established at the Military 
Medical School, was named "Ottoman Union" and led İshak Sukuti, Mehmet Reşit, 
Abdullah Cevdet, Ibrahim Temo and Huseyinzade Ali none of whom were Turks 
(Akşin, 1987: 22). Tunaya points out that, (1952: 104) Temo had been influenced by 
the "Young Italy" movement during his visits to Italy beforehand. Thus, the structure 
of the organization was similar to that of Carbonari and Masonic organizations in 
Italy. As the organization expanded, some important bureaucrats also joined the 
organization.
During the years of the Armenian crisis, when Abdulhamid's government 
became ever more unpopular and isolated internationally, the CUP membership 
increased rapidly. The society seems to have tried to organize a coup d'etat in 1896, 
but the secret police uncovered the plot and arrested the plotters. Most of them were 
sent to internal exile. In 1895, the organization published its first regulation, which 
called for a revolution against the despotic rule of Abdulhmid II. Under this 
regulation, for the first time the name of the organization appeared as the 
"Committee of Union and Progress". According to Akşin (1987: 23-4), this name 
was accepted by the suggestion by Ahmet Rıza, who was one of the leaders of the 
organization living abroad. He was affected by Auguste Comte's positivist norm, 
which was "Order and Progress". Thus, the organization adopted it partly by adding 
the concept of "Progress" after the title of'Union" which was also the part of their 
former name, the "Ottoman Union". In this way, the organization's new name was 
accepted unanimously by all of its members.
Positivism was a suitable understanding for the committee at that time due to 
certain reasons. First of all, it did not contain religious discourse. Secondly, its 
scientific and rationalist character was necessary for the Ottoman Empire, which was
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being ruled by the arbitrary decisions of the Sultan. Thirdly, it did not have a 
revolutionary character. This would hinder a revolutionary movement against the 
sultanate, which was still the only authority that would prevent the dissolution of the 
empire. Mardin states that (1996: 57), the political choice of positivism resulted in an 
authoritarian rule. In fact, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the 
impact of Germany's "Realpolitik", pro- authoritarian rules were usually popular in 
Europe. According to him, this was also a suitable choice that would be accepted by 
the uneducated population of the Ottoman Empire.
However, it would not be proper to exaggerate the European influence on the 
ideology of the committee. The main question was about how to save the empire 
under the diverse imperialistic aims of Europe. Positivist, Islamist, Turkist, 
Westemist or centralist, they all had the same question in mind. (Tunaya, 1997: 60)
After 1895, the first major challenge to Riza's leadership was the arrival in 
Paris in 1896 of Mizancı Murat Bey, who was the editor of the liberal paper 
"Mizancı" (Balance), first in Istanbul and then, in Cairo, in 1895. Although a liberal, 
Murat attached greater importance to the caliphate and to the Islamic character of the 
empire than did Rıza. On this issue, he was more in tune with the majority of the 
émigré movement, which elected him president of the CUP in Ahmet Riza's place 
after his arrival in Paris. Early in 1897, Murat and a group of followers moved the 
headquarters of the CUP to Geneva.
Between the years 1897 and 1899 the movement had been dealt a serious 
blow. During this period, Sultan Abdulhamid made use of his increased prestige, the 
war against Greece was victorious- to deal with the internal and external opposition. 
Many of the members of the committee were sent to exile in Tripolitania, while at 
the same time agents of the Sultan managed to persuade Mizancı Murat and a
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number of other members to return in order to help the Sultan in his reforms. Thus, 
the credibility of the many of the pioneers was crushed. Such a development forced 
Ahmed Rıza, once again, to appear as the undisputed leader of the movement in 
exile.
By 1899, the movement received new impetus due to some developments. 
The most important one was German attempts to complete and realize the Baghdad 
Railway project and acquire the most prestigious position (Akşin, 1987: 39). For this 
reason, Kaiser William II made official visits to the Ottoman Empire and declared 
himself as the greatest friend of all Muslims. This growing friendship between 
Abdulhamid II and the Kaiser resulted in a new kind of awakening among the 
Young Turks with the involvement of new members who were more sympathetic to 
cooperation with the British. Another important event was the arrival of Mahmud 
Celaleddin Pasha in Paris, who fled there with his two sons, Sabahettin and 
Lutfullah. (Ziircher, 1993: 92) He played a similar role that was played by Mustafa 
Fazıl Pasha, a generation earlier among the Young Ottomans. At the same time his 
elder son Sabahettin, posed the most serious threat to Ahmet Riza's authority. 
Sabahetin was a pure liberal, who believed in minimal government and the power of 
free enterprise to regenerate the empire, while Ahmet Rıza was becoming more and 
more of an Ottoman nationalist. They divided the movement between themselves and 
this split became manifest at the first "Congress of Ottoman Liberals" organized in 
Paris in 1902.
Two important theses were discussed at this congress (Akşin, 1987: 44). 
According to the majority, which included the Armenian organizations and 
Sabahettin's group, propaganda should not be continued only through publications. 
They demanded both violence and foreign intervention in the empire permissible as
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means to remove Abdulhamid II. On the other side, Ahmet Rıza rejected this, with 
the fear of threathening the independence of the empire.
After the congress the split was formalized when Sabahettin founded first the 
"Society of Ottoman Liberals" and then "Society for Private Initiative and 
Decentralization" in 1906”. In line with the decisions of the congress, Sabahettin's 
faction attempted to organize a military coup d'etat with the help of the Ottoman 
garrison in Tripolitania, but this remained stillborn. For the more nationalist and 
centralist wing of the movement led by Ahmet Rıza, 1905 and 1906 were crucial 
years. As a result of the Russo- Japanese war of 1904-5 and the the first Russian 
revolution afterwards, Ottoman nationalism and constitutionalism received a boost. 
In the war, for the first time, an Asiatic state had defeated one of the great imperial 
powers of Europe and in the following unrest, the tsar had been forced to grant 
Russia a legislative assembly and a measure of constitutionalism. This event inspired 
the Ottoman opposition movement, while on a practical level the arrival in Paris of 
two more Young Turks, Bahaettin Sakir and Dr. Nazim, strengthened it. They gave 
the CUP a sound organizational basis, with branches in many parts of the empire and 
adjacent countries and an effective secretariat and communications. (Çavdar, 1991: 
28)
In order to unite the whole opposition movement, a second congress was held 
in Paris in 1907. In this time, the initiative came from Armenian groups, and even the 
reorganized CUP now agreed to the use of violent means. The reason for this change 
of attitude laid in developments within the empire. Small local groups had survived 
the crackdown of 1896, but contact between them had been lost. New groups were 
founded constantly, but none of them managed to establish a nationwide network 
until the founding of the "Ottoman Freedom Society" in Salonica, in 1906. The
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driving force behind the committee was Mehmet Talât who had been banished 
because of his involvement in the CUP in 1896. As a result of his organizational 
genius, the Ottoman Freedom Society spread rapidly in Macedonia. The crucial 
development was the involvement of officers from the Third ( Macedonian) and 
Second (Edime) armies, in which Major Enver of the Third Army staff played a 
leading role. In 1907, the Salonica group established contact with the émigrés in 
Paris and, bound the ideas of Ahmet Rıza much more to their liking than those of 
Sabahettin. They decided to merge their group with Ahmet Riza's, eventually 
adopting the traditional name of CUP. In spite of this name, however, it was the 
center in Salonica and not in Paris, that became the headquarters of various the 
opposition movements within the Ottoman Empire.
In this congress, the committee accepted a regulation. Improving the 
educational and cultural level of the population, realization of the unity of the 
Ottoman people, superiority of law, putting the constitution into force and 
establishment of a constitutional government and devoting all the financial and 
mental efforts to this end, constituted the main themes of the regulation.
3.2. The Second Constitutional Period:
Salonica and Rumelia were the active parts of the empire that dynamited the 
awakening for a second constitution (Zürcher, 1993: 104). Salonica was also the 
center of the CUP organization within the empire, which was going to become a 
myth for Turkey's political life later on. At that time, there were three strategically 
important regions within the Ottoman Empire. These were Anatolia, Rumelia, Arabia 
and the Princes' Islands near Istanbul. The Islands and Thrace shared similiar aspects 
sociologically and were cosmopolitan areas composed of a variety of nationalities,
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races and religions. The majority of the population was composed of Turks, 
Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians and Greeks. As religion Sunni Islam and Orthodox 
Christianity were dominant. Rumelia's social values had never been transformed by 
the Ottoman Empire throughout five centuries of its domination over the area.
For this reason, beginning from the first quarter of the nineteenth century, 
Rumelia became the center of the game played by the European powers with 
imperialistic aims, among which English, Russian and Hungarian efforts were the 
most dominant ones. Thus, in order to achieve their aims, they fostered the 
nationalistic ideas of these people. By this way, they were able to intervene in the 
internal affairs and challenged the power of the central authority. Uprisings had 
occurred again in Rumelia during the first constitutional period. In order to initiate 
the reform movements in this area, many foreign commissions had visited there. 
Serbian and Bulgarian raiders, who were influenced by the nationalistic ideas, 
constituted a model for the Ottoman reformist soldiers and civilian people within that 
area.
Salonica may be considered as the center of the reformist movements. It was 
on one of the main trade routes and there was a connection via railway to Austria- 
Hungary and Germany. Sea trade was also very important especially for the Russian, 
French, Italian, Greek and Turkish riggers. Being located in such a geography, 
Salonica was also open to political influences coming from Europe. Even, the first 
workers movement within the empire took place in that area. So, these reasons may 
well prove why the reformist movements in the empire had its roots in Salonica 
(Zürcher, 1993: 110).
Thus, these centers constituted the shelf for the Unionist military officers who 
led the revolution of July 1908. With the enlargement of the committee, there
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appeared the problem of discipline and strategy. The center in Salonica had to be 
strong enough to control the whole organization in order to prevent independent 
activities. To serve such a mission, a new committee was established within the 
committee. This sub- committee was named "Fedai"(The Bodyguard). Their major 
function was to conduct assassinations against the high officials.
About 1908, new developments occurred out of the committee’s control. The 
Russian Tsar and King Edward VII of Britain met at Reval in the Baltic. As they 
both had a common fear of Germany, their tendency to draw closer to each other was 
inevitable. They tried to solve some of the remaining problems between them. One of 
the results was a proposal for the settlement of the Macedonian problem, based on 
foreign control, which would leave the Sultan with only formal suzerainty. When 
news of the Reval meeting reached Salonica, accompanied by rumors that Britain 
and Russia had agreed to partition the Ottoman Empire, the CUP decided to act. 
They published a regulation about the complete rejection of the meeting’s decisions 
and sent these regulations to all foreign embassies.
The officers, who were members of the Committee, including Enver took to 
the hills with their troops and demanded the restoration of the constitution in a 
coordinated campaign. The Sultan tried to quell the revolt by sending first 
trustworthy officers and then Anatolian troops to Macedonia, but some of the officers 
were killed and the troops, which were influenced by CUP agitators aboard their 
ships, refused to fight the insurgents. The Sultan, then, gave in and restored the 
Ottoman constitution in July 1908.
In the European provinces of the empire this was clear enough, because the 
CUP sent delegations to every major town to announce the reinstatement of the 
constitutional regime and to explain its advantages to the population. The Unionist
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officers who headed these delegations took pains to explain that it was the 
Committee and not the sultan that was responsible for the change. However, in the 
Asiatic provinces and in the capital, Istanbul, the situation looked very different. The 
Hamidian regime's strict censorship had prevented the news from Macedonia from 
reaching the public. Hence the sultan could successfully present his own version of 
events, which was that he had been misled by treacherous advisors into thinking that 
the country was not ready for constitutional rule, but that he now had come to the 
conclusion that the time was ripe. (Çavdar, 1991: 42)
As the news spread all over the empire, public reaction in Istanbul and Asia 
was similar to that in Macedonia, full of joy and relief At the same time, in many 
places, including the capital, people took revenge on the representatives of the old 
regime, forcing the dismissal of the officials and hunting down the known members 
of the espionage system. Freedom of thought, expression and association brought 
about by the constitutional revolution, resulted not only in political demonstrations, 
either with joy or anger, but also in widespread labour unrest. The government was 
alarmed by the strikes and, with the support of the CUP, reacted by enacting labour 
legislation which banned trade unions in the public sector, introduced compulsory 
arbitration and made strike action extremely difficult. This legislation effectively 
suppressed the labor movement. The role of the CUP in the defeat of the strikes was 
interesting, because it indicated that the committee- the champion per excellence of 
constitutional liberty- sided unequivocally with the capitalists in suppressing the 
freedom, such as it was, of organized labour. (Çavdar, 1991: 67)
However, in this atmosphere, the CUP did not take power in its own hands or 
even depose the Sultan whom it had opposed for twenty years. One reason was that, 
because of his manipulation of public opinion, many people saw the Sultan as the
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hero of these developments. Instead of removing him, the CUP felt able to take the 
reins of government into their own hands. As a result, the committee chose to leave 
politics in the hands of the existing cabinet under the Grand Vizier Sait Pasha. In the 
meantime, it set up itself as a watchdog with a mission to guard the newly founded 
constitutional freedoms. In the following years, the CUP's position as a secret society 
exerting pressure and holding political power without any formal responsibility was 
proved to be a destabilizing factor.
The main event of the months after the revolution was the first elections in 
the last thirty years. The committee spread its organization far into the Asiatic 
provinces and North Africa. While the committee almost exclusively consisted of 
Muslims and was largely Turkish, it actively sought the cooperation of the other 
nationalities, guaranteeing them a number of seats in the new parliament (Tunaya, 
1988: 29). The only organization to contest in the elections, besides the CUP was the 
new party founded by the followers of Prince Sabahettin named the Osmcmli Ahrar 
Fırkası (Party of Ottoman Liberals). This, however, did not have a serious 
nationwide organization and managed to eventually win only one seat.
Thus, after the constitutional revolution and the elections, the power of the 
palace was curbed but not eliminated. The leading bureaucrats of the Porte re­
emerged as an independent political factor for the first time since 1878, while the 
CUP stayed in the background, relying on its majority in parliament to control the 
government.
Through 1908 and the early months of 1909, the CUP was the most powerful 
force in the country. However, they had to contend with two types of opposition 
(Tunaya, 1988: 27). The first one was Osmanh Ahrar Fırkası, which had done badly 
in the elections and felt increasingly frustrated especially by the influence of Kamil
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Pasha. However, the CUP succeeded in having the pasha voted out of office in 
parliament and had him replaced with Huseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was close to the 
committee. The second type of opposition, which faced the CUP, was that of 
conservative religious circles, notably the lower ulema and sheiks of the dervish 
orders. The religious extremists organized themselves as the "ittihad-i 
Muhammedi" (Muhammadan Union). They organized large-scale propaganda against 
the policies and secularism of the Young Turks.
As a result of rising tensions, an armed insurrection broke out in the capital in 
the name of the restoration of Islam and Sharia. The rebels marched to the parliament 
building and presented their demands and Sultan accepted them all. As a result of 
this, the Unionists went underground or fled the capital. On the other hand, the CUP 
had kept its position in the provinces, notably in Macedonia, and it immediately 
started to take countermeasures. It started the organization of a military campaign 
against the rebels. The “Action Army” was put together for this campaign. It 
occupied Istanbul without much resistance and the revolt was suppressed.
There were several reasons for this revolt. Different groups had become 
disenchanted with the constitutional regime for different reasons (Zurcher: 1993: 
103. First of all, it was not welcomed by the civil servants who supplied the Sultan 
with espionage. The new government had aimed at ending the overstaffing of the 
government departments which resulted in thousands of jobless civil servants. The 
second discontent occurred in the army especially between "mektepR" (officer who 
has graduated from a military school) and "a/qy/f (officer that rose from the ranks) 
officers). Now the “mektepli” officers had taken over and they wanted to impose 
Prussian training methods. Thirdly, the lower ulema clearly felt threatened by the 
change in atmosphere, which the constitutional revolution had brought about,
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although the CUP had enacted not explicitly secularist legislation since the 
revolution.
The counter- revolution had shown the fragility of the constitutional regime 
and of the type of modernizing policies for which the committee stood (Zürcher, 
1993: 104). In that sense, it was a traumatic experience and a lesson, which would 
not be forgotten by the Unionists.
3.3 The Political Situation in 1909-13:
After the counter- revolution attempt, it was understood that the CUP 
depended on its military members and its influence over the army for political 
position. Although, it contravened the constitution after the revolution, the serving 
officers were allowed to sit in the parliament. The interference of the military men in 
politics and the politicization of the army were the main target issues of the 
opposition after 1910, but when such a tactic was not successful, they organized an 
anti- Unionist movement within the army and threatened an armed insurrection.
Between 1909 and 1911, a number of new parties were formed. The old 
opponents of the CUP established some, while some others were established by the 
dissident Unionists who favored a more liberal or a more conservative line. In the 
first category the "Mutedil Hiirriyetperveran Fırkası"(Party of Moderate Liberals) 
and the "Islahat-i Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası"(Party of Fundemantal Ottoman 
Reforms), were founded towards the end of 1909. The "Ahali Firkasi'XPeople’s 
Party), and the "Hizb-i Cedid" (New Party), were founded in 1910 and early 1911 
respectively, and belonged to the second category. Within this period, the first 
organized socialist activity in the empire appeared and opposed the way in which the
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Unionists had suppressed the trade unions and the right to strike after the 
constitutional revolution.
The growth of the opposition was given new impetus in 1910 with the 
outbreak of large-scale insurrection in Albania and then the assasination of Ahmet 
Samim (7-1910)- a journalist who critisized CUP in his writings- (Çavdar, 1991: 62). 
Later in that year, the opposition groups and parties united under a new party, called 
the "Hürriyet ve İtila f Fırkası"(Party of Freedom and Understanding). It was 
composed of conservatives or liberals, all feeling hatred for the CUP. As the 
opposition managed to win a by- election in Istanbul, having defeated the CUP 
candidate three weeks after its foundation, the CUP decided to take an effective 
action against the opposition. In the elections held in 1912, the committee, usually 
with intimidation, made sure of its majority.
After 1912, international politics also gained a new impetus with new threats 
which appeared as a result of the irredentist claims of the Balkan states, the designs 
of rival imperialist powers on Ottoman territory and the separatist movements among 
the non- Turkish communities of the empire (Çavdar, 1991:80). The ideological 
character of these troubles made the committee more sensitive, as they came to 
power claiming to represent all Ottoman communities (Zürcher, 1993: 105). From 
1910, onwards a series of uprisings broke out among Albanians, which was basically 
a protest against the centralizing policies of the CUP. The second major revolt was in 
Yemen, which resulted in an agreement whereby Yemen stayed in the nominal 
control of the Ottoman Empire. The pressure of imperialist expansion, and especially 
the Italian ambitions in North Africa during that period of time can be considered as 
the third threat. The province of Tripolitania was important for the Italians as a last 
part of territory, which had not been occupied by France or Britain. Thus, capturing
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the province would well fit their ambitions for expanding in Africa and in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. They sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman government in 1911, 
demanding Ottoman consent to the occupation of Tripolitania. The Ottoman 
government rejected the ultimatum and in spite of this Italy declared war. They 
captured the city without much resistance and the government could do very little as 
the Italians controlled the seas. As the loss of the province would seriously affect the 
credibility of the Sultan's government in the eyes of its Arab subjects further east, the 
CUP demanded countermeasures to be taken. When nothing was done, the Unionist 
officers within the CUP, led by Major Enver, decided to act. About 50 officers went 
as volunteers (fedai) to Tripolitania via Egypt or Tunisia to galvanize Arab 
resistance. During the next year, the Bedouin troops led by these officers 
successfully harassed the Italians and prevented them from going further inland. 
However, the Italians did not give up the struggle. In 1912 they threatened to bomb 
the Dardanelles but as a result of a Russian ultimatum, they shied away. At the end, 
the Ottomans had to conclude a fast peace agreement and during the negotiations 
Tripolitania and the Dodecanese islands were left to the Italians.
3.4 The Balkan Wars:
Until 1912 the Balkan states did not want to take serious action to remove the 
Ottomans from Europe, which had always been their aim after the sixteenth century. 
The reason for that was the disagreement over the division of the spoils and a general 
fear of the Ottoman military (Çavdar, 1991: 80). During the years 1911 and 1912, 
some alliances were made between the Balkan states in order to occupy the European 
territories of the Ottoman Empire and gain their independence. These included 
alliances between Greece and Bulgaria, Serbia and Bulgaria and Montenegro and
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Serbia. In the meantime, the Ottoman - Italian war had shown the political and 
military weakness of the empire, thus encouraging the Balkan states to act.
These allied Balkan states sent a joint ultimatum to the Porte, demanding far- 
reaching reforms under foreign control in Macedonia. The Ottomans rejected the 
kind of renunciation of sovereignty the ultimatum implied. Thereupon, Montenegro 
declared war against the Ottomans and this was followed by the other states.
The Ottoman army was not ready for such a war. They did not withdraw, but 
fought the Serbians and the Bulgarians simultaneously and faced a great loss. 
Following the repeated defeats, the situation became hopeless and the Ottoman 
government agreed to an armistice. Two diplomatic congresses were held and agreed 
on leaving the possession of Istanbul and the Straits to the Ottomans and the creation 
of a new independent state of Albania. Regarding the other issues like the division of 
the spoils in Europe and the new boundaries in Macedonia and Thrace, the 
negotiations were deadlocked as a result of a coup d'etat in Istanbul on January 
23,1913.
3.5 The Bâb-ı Âli Coup;
The London Conference gave an oppurtunity to the inner circle of the CUP, 
led by Talat and Enver, to act in order to force the government out of office. When it 
became clear that the government was going to leave Edirne to the Bulgarians-, 
which was an issue of great emotional importance since Edirne was a Muslim town 
and a former capital of the Ottoman Empire-, the Unionists had found their 
justification and launched their coup. Kamil Pasha was forced to resign. A new 
cabinet was formed and Mahmud Şevket Pasha returned as the Grand Vizier and War 
Minister.
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After the coup, the Balkan states announced the resumption of hostilities. 
Although the CUP insisted on aggressive policy with counter- attacks, the Unionists 
had to recognize that the empire had no choice, but to negotiate for peace. On 16 
April, a new armistice was concluded. The Treaty of London was signed on June 10. 
The Ottomans lost the territory to the north and west of a line from Enoz on the 
Aegean to Midye on the Black Sea, including Edime. In the meantime, the tension 
between the different Balkan states were mounting. With attacks on Bulgaria from all 
sides, the second Balkan War started. In such a situation, a group of junior officers 
led by Enver, with the backing of the CUP, took the initiative and launched an attack 
on Edirne in July. Edirne was retaken and the Bulgarians were forced to sign the 
Istanbul Peace Agreement in September 29, 1913, which restored the province of 
Edirne to the Ottoman Empire.
3.6 Teskilat-i Mahsusa:
Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, " Te§kilat-i Mahsusa" was 
established as a secret service in order to rally to the CUP’s defense in times of crisis 
and to do the committee’s covert work such as political assassinations. Landau states 
that (1995:52), it was established by Enver Pasha and remained under his control 
until the end of World War I. Beforehand, a group of volunteers within the CUP who 
were known as "fedais", in a way, represented a similar secret organization. They 
played an important role in the liberation of Edirne again under the leadership of 
Enver Pasha who in return was announced as "hero" by the people. They were also 
prominent in the episode of the Action Army in 1909 and many of them had served 
in Tripolitania, organizing Arab guerrillas against the Italians. After retaking Edirne , 
members of the group started a guerrilla movement in Western Thrace, the area west
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of the Maritza River, which was inhabited by Turkish- speaking Muslims. For this 
purpose "Garbi Trakya Hiikümet-i MuvakkatazT (Government of Western Thrace) 
was established. It was used by the Ottomans to put pressure on the Bulgarians at 
peace talks and terminated once the desired concessions had been received. It only 
lasted for two months. According to Ziircher (1993: 114) "It was a kind of laboratory 
for the national resistance movement which would develop in Anatolia after the First 
World War". He also states that, the organization was formalized under the name of 
"Teşkilat-IMahsusa" in 1914. During World War I, it played an important role in the 
suppression of separatist movements in the Arab provinces and also in terror 
campaigns against Greek businesses in western Asia Minor. Besides, they continued 
to serve the committee parallel with the agents of the Benevolent Islamic Society, 
devoting much of their energy to guerrilla and sabotage activities among the Muslim 
subjects of the Triple Entente, chiefly in India and Central Asia, and also made Pan­
Islamic propaganda there and in other areas such as China. It also operated outside 
the empire, where it tried to fan Muslim resistance to the Russian, French and British 
administration in their respective colonial empires. Landau emphasizes their 
activities abroad and adds that its members carried Pan- Islamist and Pan- Turkist 
propoganda (1995: 52). According to him, they were sent to Iran, Afghanistan, India 
and elsewhere, depending on the Russian sources indicating that they crossed 
Transcaucasia.
In October 1918, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was officially dissolved. However, 
according to Hüsamettin Ertürk, (1957:175-6) Enver Pasha had wanted Ertürk to 
reorganize the organization under the name o f" Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilali Teşkilatı" 
(General Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic World) and had told him that the
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struggle was going to continue in Caucasia. However, Enver Pasha actually did it at 
the Baku Congress later on.
3.7 CUP During World War I:
It can be said that after the January 1913 coup d'etat, the CUP was in 
complete control of the internal political situation since they tightened their hold on 
the government ever further (Ak$in, 1987: 253). Talat entered the cabinet as Minister 
of the Interior, Enver was made a pasha and became the Minister of War, and Cemal 
was also given the rank of "Pasha" during which the Grand Vizier was Sait Halim 
Pasha, who was a member of the inner circle of the CUP. The regime that now 
developed has often been called the Triumvirate of Enver, Cemal and Talat. Enver 
controlled the army and Talat had great power within the committee. Cemal was very 
influential in the determination of national politics (Shaw, 1983: 360). Elections for a 
new parliament were held in the winter of 1913-14. The Liberal Opposition Party did 
not participate in the elections. As a result, the parliament that emerged was an 
instrument of the CUP.
As World War I started, the crucial issue for the CUP was, which side- the 
Entente or the Central- to be chosen to make an alliance. First, Cemal Pasha 
approached the Entente powers. However, they expected more from collaboration 
with alliance with Balkan states than from an Ottoman connection as they had good 
relations with Russia. The Unionists, then, contacted the central powers by the 
initiatives of Enver and Talat. On July 28, 1914, in a conversation with the German 
ambassador, Wangenheim, Enver Pasha openly proposed a defensive alliance with 
Germany. On August 2, 1914, an agreement was signed between the Ottoman
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Empire and Germany. The reasons that the Ottomans signed an agreement that lead it 
to war were various.
Without doubt, Enver Pasha was the most active player in the decision­
making mechanism of the Ottoman Empire during World War I as the Minister of 
War (Shaw, 1983. 360). At the beginning, Enver Pasha would have preferred to 
delay the declaration of war until the Spring of 1915 since he thought that the empire 
was unprepared and could not go to war without first receiving sizeable German 
subsidies and armaments. However, the German government increased its pressure. 
The war could no longer be postponed. The decision to fight was taken on October 
25 and two days later Goeben and Braslow set sail with the explicit orders from 
Enver to attack the Russian fleet. By 11 November the Ottoman Empire was at war 
with Russia, France and Britain.
The Ottomans fought in many fronts during the war; in the south in Sinai 
Desert and Suez Canal, Kutii’l Amare and Iraq, in the east in Sarıkamış, in the west 
in Dardanelles and in east Europe at Galicia. At the request of the German general 
staff they were also sent to assist the Germans and Austrians in Galicia and the 
Bulgarians in Macedonia. Ottoman divisions did not only fight on Ottoman territory. 
Sending these troops to Europe was a luxury because as of the second half of 1916, 
things began to go wrong on all fronts. After that time until the end of war, the only 
positive development, after the Russian Revolution of November 1917, was that the 
Russian government asked for an armistice. At the following peace negotiations in 
Brest- Litovsk ( December- March 1918), the Russians agreed to evacuate eastern 
Anatolia, including the areas they had conquered in 1878, but while negotiations 
were going on, the Russian army in Anatolia was collapsing and Turkish forces 
retook the area. They were successful at Kutii’I Amare, Dardanelles and Galicia.
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However, Suez Canal fronts and Sarıkamış front under the leadership of Enver Pasha 
ended in disaster.
From August 8 onwards, the German army in France was forced to retreat. 
The British army made its decisive breakthrough on the Palestinian front and the 
remnants of the Ottoman army retreated to the north. Bulgaria, which had joined the 
central powers in 1915 and had formed a vital link between Germany, Austria and 
the Ottoman Empire, was defeated by a British- French expeditionary force. The 
Unionist government now realized that it had no choice, but to sue for an armistice. It 
also foresaw that negotiations involving the wartime leadership would be difficult. 
The cabinet therefore resigned and was replaced by one led by General Ahmet İzzet 
Pasha. The armistice was signed between an Ottoman delegation led by Hüseyin 
Rauf Orbay and the commander of the British Black Sea squadron, on October 31, 
1918.
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CHAPTER IV
ENVER PASHA: OTTOMANIST. PAN- ISLAMIST OR PAN-TÜRK1ST?
4.1: A biography of Enver Pasha:
Enver Pasha wrote his autobiography, covering the period beginning from his 
birth until July, 23 1908. The following biography will be written according to this 
source and some quotations will be given where necessary. Enver Pasha was bom in 
Istanbul in December 6, 1882 as the son of Ahmed Bey. He says "I did not have a 
rich family, however they did everything to afford my education" (Hanioglu, 1989: 
253). For his primary education, he went to different schools in different cities 
because of his father's appointments. He finished the primary school in Monastir and 
continued his education in the military school. In 1901, he graduated from “Erkan-i 
Harbiye Mektebi” as a captain staff officer. He was then appointed to the Third Army 
in Salonica. He attended the attacks against the Bulgarian rebels there. For his 
experience in Salonica Enver Pasha says: "When I arrived at Salonica, I have 
realized that, my ideals should change. It was so difficult to make some reforms 
within the regiment and no one opted to do big jobs. Therefore, everyone had to do 
on his behalf" (Hanioglu, 1989, 260).
Afterwards he was appointed to different regiments along the Bulgarian 
boundary and when he was in Uskup, he realized that he was going to be alone there,
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which meant that he would make the changes he wanted. In his autobiography, he 
states that (Hanioğlu, 1989: 263) there were many colonels in the army who were not 
able to achieve the necessary discipline for their squadrons. In his opinion, this was 
the result of the arbitrary and unskillful rule of Abdulhamid II. He says, "I was 
becoming to be aware of the necessity of a constitution instead of Abdulhamid's 
repressive rule. Otherwise, every other attempt would be unsuccessful".
In 1906, he became adjutant major. In the meantime, he joined the secret 
organization “Ottoman Freedom Society” and played a leading role in joining the 
organization to the CUP. During that time period he met with Talat Bey.
The meeting in Reval between Edward VII of England and Tsar Nikolai II 
and their decision about the Macedonian problem made the Unionists to think that, 
Abdulhamid was going to do nothing about the partition of Rumelia. So, a group of 
officers, including Enver, took to the hills and demanded the restoration of the 
constitution. They captured "Köprülü" town and declared the constitution in July 23 
1908. Abdulhamid, as he wanted to prevent the uprisings, also declared the 
constitution one-day later. Enver, in his return to Istanbul, achieved fame as 'hero of 
freedom' and was appointed military attaché in Berlin.
As the counter- revolution on March 31 occurred, he returned to Istanbul and 
joined the “Action Army”. After the suppression of the rebellion and the dethroning 
of Abdulhamid II, he decided to stay in Istanbul and worked for the strengthening of 
the CUP within the army.
In 1911, as the Italians attacked Libya, he was appointed as the commander of 
Bingazi front. Because of his success in the War of Tripolitania, he was appointed to 
the rank of lieutenant colonel. About the middle of 1912, because of the loss of a 
great number of men and the supressive means taken by the CUP, there appeared an
66
opposition against the Unionists within the empire. This group which was named 
"Saviour Officers", demanded the abolishment of the parliament and a new anti­
Unionist government. The CUP lost authority for a while. However, with the 
establishment of the "Grand Cabinet" and the appointment of Mahmud Şevket Pasha 
as the Grand Vizier, this discontent was suppressed.
By the time, Enver returned from Bingazi, as an honorable commander was 
active in the suppression of Bulgarians in Çatalca during the first Balkan War. In the 
Babiali Coup in January 23, 1913, he was the leader. During the second Balkan War 
he was the commander of the army and because of his militarily successful attitude, 
Edirne was retaken in July 22, 1913 from the Bulgarians. Because of these successes, 
he was first appointed as colonel and then also acquired an additional rank. In 
January 1914, he became the head of General Staff. Beginning from this time, until 
1918, the triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Cemal ruled the empire.
In 1914, he married Sultan Mehmed V's cousin, Naciye Sultan and acquired 
the title of "Damctd" (The Groom) in the palace. As the head of General Staff, he 
took some revolutionary measures. He lowered the ranks of some of the unsuccessful 
officers or fired some of them. In August 2, 1914, he signed a common defense 
alliance with Germany against Russia. After, the entry of the Ottoman Empire to 
World War I, he established close contacts with the German military officers. He led 
the third army during the war and was defeated by the Russians at Sarıkamış. He was 
also the leading person in the conquest of Baku after the Russian Revolution. 
However, the Ottoman Empire was defeated front by front and the cabinet of Talat 
Pasha resigned. After the Mondros Armistice, Enver Pasha fled to Odessa and then to 
Berlin with some of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress in 
November 1, 1918.
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In 1920, he met with the Bolshevik leader Karl Radek and went to Moscow. 
The Russians rejected his plan about creating an opposition movement against 
Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. In the same year he attended “Doğu Halkları Kurultayı” 
(The Congress of the Peoples of the East) in Baku. He left Moscow after the 
assassination of Talat Pasha and went to Berlin again. There, he established İslam 
İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı with the aim of making opposition against imperialism. 
Russia, which supported " Türkiye Halk Şuraları Fırkası" beforehand, did not support 
Enver Pasha because of his actions to establish an independent Türkistan. Enver 
Pasha organized the Second Islamic Conference and went to Türkistan. There he 
reorganized Basmachi forces against Soviet Russia and started a war of 
independence in Bukhara and Fergana. He defeated the Soviet forces and sent an 
ultimatum to Moscow for the remembrance of his government. So, the Red Army 
attacked Enver Pasha's forces and captured Horasan, Bukhara and Türkistan in a 
short period of time. During these attacks, Enver Pasha was killed and was buried 
around Bukhara at Çegan Hill.
4.2: An analysis of Enver Pasha’s Activities and Statements:
During his lifetime, there were many actions taken by Enver Pasha that may 
prove his Ottomanist, Pan- Islamist and Pan- Turkist tendencies at different times. 
There are contradictory arguments among historians about his political choice. Three 
arguments- Ottomanist, Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist- were put forward by 
different historians. In order to find out the answer to these questions, the activities 
and the statements of Enver Pasha will be analyzed. This part’s aim is not to present 
a biographical approach. Instead, in order to figure out if there occurred a change in 
his political preferences, a chronological order had to be followed. In the concluding
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part, a comparative analysis will be done regarding the arguments of his political 
choices.
4.2.1: The CUP Years;
Enver Pasha's first appointment was to Macedonia. This was perhaps the 
crucial coincidence in his lifetime that would in the future make him "hero of 
freedom". Aydemir states that (1983: 462), "If Enver had been appointed to Baghdat, 
Yemen or Erzincan, he would not have been a hero". This is a precise argument 
because the Third Army in Macedonia was full of young, rebellious and ambitious 
officers. They were fighting with the Bulgarian komitjadis. Regarding their 
psychology Aydemir makes a precise argument and defines these officers' mode as 
"targetless patriotism". This was because they did not know which society or to 
which state they belonged. The people they were fighting against in Rumelia were 
full of nationalistic ambitions. However these officers lacked such feelings. They 
only knew that they were "Ottomans". So, Ottomanism was the dominant current 
during those times among the Ottoman officers. Enver Pasha was also among them, 
as the conditions required so. Thus, he was only fighting for that ideal. The following 
words of him are a good proof of his targetless patriotism: (Aydemir, 1983:488)
All these struggles (He is talking about the struggles in 
Macedonia and Salonica) made us think about the situation. Instead of 
the brigands that were destroyed every day, the new ones were 
appearing. The Palace was unable to suppress such rebellions.
As the Ottomans also lost the trust of the European powers, 
there was a greater possibility for the loss of a part of Rumelia.
Our Albanian friends, being aware of the situation, decided to 
take care of themselves. They started to getting armed against the 
Greek threat.
In such a situation, everyone preferred to fight for the 
improvement of the rule of Istanbul, meaning the Sultan and the 
Palace in order to either save the empire or to die for such an 
honorable reason, instead of living in such a humiliating way.
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The first step that prepared the ground for his entrance to the Committee of 
Union and Progress was his entrance to the "Ottoman Freedom Society" with the 
reference of his uncle, Halil Kut. He, then went to Monastir and worked to organize 
the society there. Later on, this society joined with the Committee of Union and 
Progress under the leadership of Enver.
4.2.2: Post- 1908 Period:
After his success in the declaration of the Constitution in 1908 in Monastir, 
he returned to Salonica as a hero. The local newspapers demanded a statement from 
him. He wrote the following statement, which contains Ottomanist attitudes: 
(Aydemir, 1993: 17)
People,
I thank for your gratefulness. I did nothing to deserve such an 
interest. A mission, that every Ottoman would like to do, is by faith 
appointed to me. If I had done it properly, then this price is enough for 
me.
Thanks to God that we established the Constitution. We took 
our freedom back. But this does not mean that the mission has ended. 
In order to improve the first step that we took in the name of progress, 
we have to work a lot and be careful. Thus, from now on, we, as the 
people, whether Muslim or non- Muslim will work together in order to 
improve our state and society.
According to Hanioglu, (1989: 20) the only motive that encouraged Enver 
Pasha to take such a revolutionary action was his Ottomanist nationalism. It can be 
understood from his following statement that, he was against the existence of a 
parliament. ( Hanioglu, 1989:20)
As a soldier, I believe in the absolute supremacy of the army... 
All the ordinary ‘brains’ that want to share the authority have to be 
supressed. A Frenchman tells a truth: ‘ Before the republican rule, 
there was only one despot, but now, there are hundreds of them 
because each parliamentarian wants to reflect his own authority. ’
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In his understanding of nationalism- like many other CUP members- there 
was deep opposition against Western imperialism. Hence, the spread of nationalism 
within the empire was a result of Western impact through different ways. In his 
autobiography, Enver Pasha’s reaction to such interference by the West can be 
understood in the following words: ( Hanioglu, 1989: 23)
If I had not known the beauties of your culture, I would live 
my life better here. But if happy and lighthearted Bedevis became 
civilized one day; they would loose all their virtues and would be 
spoiled. Their physical living conditions would not be enough for 
them and this unhappiness becomes a need for them. They would get 
catch the illness of "civilization"; however, they could not find a cure 
for it. Your civilization is like a poison that awakens the people. 
However, it never lets one to sleep again. If one closes his eyes, this 
would be during his death. The biggest difference is that, you take life 
so simple.
With these words, Enver Pasha criticizes the humiliating and expansionist 
attitude of the western culture. He defined The War of Tripolitania as "the struggle of 
the people defending their country against a treacherous European nation that want to 
fill the treasuries of their banks" (Hanioglu, 1989:24)
4.2.3:Enver Pasha and the Turkist Associations:
According to Landau (1995: 38), Pan- Turkists began to organize in the 
Ottoman Empire following the Young Turk Revolution. Before that time, such 
activity was dangerous as Abdulhamid II and his spies were suspicious of any form 
of organization. However, after 1908, the new regime was more amenable to allow 
Pan- Turkist organization. The increasing presence of “outside Turk” émigrés 
provided an added impetus to such organization. The various organizations 
established at that time were mainly scholarly or nationalist groupings that adopted 
and maintained Pan- Turk policies.
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In August 1911, an association called "Türk Yurdu" (The Homeland of the 
Turks) was founded in Istanbul. It was composed of intellectuals noted for Pan- Turk 
sympathies such as Mehmed Emin Yurdakul, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali 
Hüseyinzade, Ali Muhtar and others. Later on, Ziya Gökalp was also coopted. The 
association's objectives were defined as raising the cultural level of the Turks, but 
another important aim was to set up a meeting- ground for nationalists and Pan- 
Turkiststo join forces. (Landau, 1995: 41)
The area of interest of the journal included a wide range of Turks; from the 
Yakut people of northeastern Siberia to the Turks in the Balkans. In the daily short 
columns entitled " Türk Dünyasından"(From the Turkish World), usually written by 
Ahmet Ağaoğlu or Yusuf Akçura, the political, social and cultural problems of the 
Turkish world were discussed with a Turkist perspective. Hence, the readers began to 
feel more sympathetic to a Turkish unity with its private problems and developments 
rather than a perspective about the reestablishment of the Ottoman Empire. However, 
such a Pan-Turkist line of the journal was mainly in cultural terms, There was no 
word for a political unity of the Turkish people.
According to Georgeon, (1999: 118) Enver Pasha was directly involved in the 
efforts for the publication o f " Türk Yurdu" journal and he was the most interested 
figure in the journal within the CUP. In one of volumes of the journal in 1915, a note 
was written about the "faithful contributions" of Enver Pasha and his name appeared 
in many volumes of the journal. Georgeon further argues that, (1999: 68) the contact 
between the CUP and Enver Pasha established the journal as the CUP supported 
Turkish nationalism although its official ideology was declared as Ottomanism. 
Enver was mostly influenced by Yusuf Akçura in his decision to enter World War I 
as an ally of Germany.
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Another important organization that Enver Pasha was active was "Türk 
0o7gz"(Hearth of the Turks) which was set up in June 1911. Mehmet Emin 
Yurdakul, Ahmet Ferit, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Fuat Sabit, Yusuf Akçura and Mehmet Ali 
Tevfık were invited to join and direct the organization. Its main objective was to 
educate the Turkish people in order to raise their intellectual, social and economic 
level for the perfection of the Turkish language and race. It strove to educate the 
people in a nationalistic spirit and teach them to esteem their cultural heritage.
Its growth was encouraged by several of the Young Turk leaders who were 
quick to realize its potential; these came to lecture before it and offered generous 
donations. Most probably, those members of the CUP who admired German 
organization- Enver in particular decided to improve "Türk Ocağı" organizationally 
and use it politically. (Landau, 1995: 41)
According to Landau, (1995: 42) a parallel and closely connected 
organization was the association of "İzci" (Boy Scouts), under direct patronage of 
Enver himself. The members of this organization received military training. 
According to a British intelligence report, (Landau, 1995: 42) their badges, scout- 
names and titles were purely Turkish and pre- Islamic.Ali and Mehmed became 
Aksonkor and Timurtash. The "White Wolf', which gave birth to Oğuz, the 
legendary ancestor of the Turkish people, figured, in spite of the Islamic prohibition, 
on standard of the Izcis, who were led by their Başbuğ (Emir) and marshaled by 
Ortabeys and Oymakbeys. They said prayers not to Allah but to Tanrı, were taught to 
regard all Turanians as their brothers, and cheered not the Caliph or the Sultan, but 
the "Hakan” of the Turks.
It can be said that after 1908 Revolution, Enver Pasha was also involved in 
the nationalistic tendencies that strengthened after the Balkan wars among the
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military officers and intellectuals. The outside Turks must also have influenced him. 
Georgeon states that, (1999: 118) Yusuf Akçura was the person who convinced 
Enver Pasha to enter World War I as an ally of Germany.
As a successful officer during the Balkan Wars, he would have understood 
the situation in the Balkans and the rise of nationalism within these people who had 
once accepted to be ruled by the Ottoman Empire. As, “how to save the empire?” 
was his only concern, he seemed to accept more nationalistic ideas after the Balkan 
Wars.
4.2.4: Enver Pasha’s relations with Germany:
One of the key issues in considering Enver Pasha's political ideal is Enver 
Pasha's relations with Germany. Many historians talk about Enver Pasha's admiration 
of Germany but usually, the reason is not stated. His appointment to Berlin as 
military attaché would have contributed to his interest to Germany. However, this 
may not be the only reason for his interest. In fact, Germany's plans over the 
Ottoman Empire and the match of these plans with those of Enver Pasha's has to be 
analyzed.
As Germany established its unity in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
it was late in acquiring colonies abroad. After 1878, with the impact of Bismarck's 
stable policies, Russian impact on the Balkans had been dissolved. However, young 
Kaiser Wilhelm II who came to power after his father's death was so aggressive that 
he established his plans on the traditional empires like Ottoman Empire, Russia, Iran 
and China. German interests towards the empire were also existent during Frederich's 
reign as he proposed a military agreement with the Ottomans. Helmuth Von Moltke, 
who stayed in the empire in the 1830s, had written reports about the empire covering
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economic and political details(Ortayli, 1998:55). He was recommending settling 
some of the German immigrants around Tundja River. Against English and French 
domination over Asia, Wilhelm had a plan. His main aim was to call for Cihad and 
to follow a Pan- Islamist propaganda over the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, Iran 
and Afghanistan. By this way, his area of influence would be reaching India, which 
he most wanted as a colony. For this purpose he managed to get a concession from 
Abdulhamid II that would make his dream about the Berlin-Baghdad Railway to 
become real. By this way, in case of a war, Germans were not going to need to 
depend on the Suez Canal. On the other hand, his other aim was to unite all the Turks 
in the Caucasus and all the Muslims in Central Asia under the rule of a Turkish- 
German alliance (Hopkirk, 1995: 2). These irredentist policies were also supported 
by Pan- Germanist groups in the German Empire. In fact, what was being planned 
under the name of Pan- Islamism was nothing but only a cover for the realization of 
Pan- Germanist ideals.
Throughout Abdulhamid II's reign, Germany established good relations with 
the Ottoman Empire as the Sultan also followed Pan- Islamist policies within the 
empire. However, the Germans did not manage to establish good relations with the 
Young Turks who were becoming more and more influential in decision- making 
process of the empire after the proclamation of the First Constitution. They 
considered the Young Turks as servants of the Jewish minority and other foreign 
powers (Hopkirk, 1995: 26). After the Bab-i Ali Coup, the German Consulate 
reported to Wilhelm that the new government was not against Germany. They had 
known that, Enver had been educated in Germany and worked as an attaché there for 
a period of time. Enver's plans matched those of Wilhelm II's, which both carried 
irredentist claims towards the East. According to Aydemir, Enver Pasha had always
75
adored Germany (1993: 542). He further argues that, admiration of Germany and its 
military had become a tradition in the military schools in the Ottoman Empire since, 
during Mahmud II's reign, reformist activities regarding the army were always led by 
experts coming from Prussia. Ottoman arms were also of German origin. Enver 
Pasha was a good opportunity for the Germans who were seeking partisans on behalf 
of themselves.
Hanioğlu presents an important detail about Germany's attempts to influence 
the Young Turk leaders after 1908, especially Enver Pasha (1989: 13,4). He analyses 
Enver Pasha's letters between March 19, 1911 and September 13, 1913 which he 
wrote to a German Lady, during the Balkan Wars. Professor Ernst Jaeckh (1875­
1959) who was an expert on the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire at that time 
owned these letters. He was also the Consultant of the German Foreign Affairs 
specializing in the Ottoman Empire. He always reported about the necessity of an 
alliance with the Ottoman Empire and believed that the Young Turks were not 
against an alliance with Germany as it was thought. He also became a close friend of 
Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, İsmet Pasha and Mustafa Kemal during the time he was in 
charge. According to Hanioğlu (1989:16), Germans used these letters for 
propaganda. For example, they omitted the third part of these letters in which Enver 
Pasha badly accused the Bulgarians who were allies of Germany and considered the 
Balkan War as a kind of Crusader attack against the Ottoman Empire. Germans 
preferred to use the second part of these letters for propaganda against the Italians 
who joined the other side despite their commitment for an alliance with the Germans. 
For this part, they also omitted the sentences telling about 'the attacks of the 
Christian World against the Ottoman Empire'. However, they did not touch the 
sentences referring about an “Islamic Unity”. ( 1989: 17)
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From the above argument made by Hanioglu, one can argue that, Enver Pasha 
was an Ottomanist during the Balkan Wars and he was against imperialism. For this 
reason, he was also dreaming about an 'Islamic Unity' perhaps because he was aware 
of the insufficiency and weakness of the Ottoman army. A unity of the Islamic world 
would strengthen the Ottoman struggle against imperialism. Aydemir states that 
(1993: 16), Pan- Islamism was not the ultimate end but rather a “dream play” for 
Enver Pasha.
His success as a commander in the conquest of Edirne in the Second Balkan 
War in 1913, increased his popularity as a soldier among the people and army. He 
became the commander of the army in 1914 and in the same year he also became one 
of the most influential leaders within the empire, together with Talat and Cemal 
Pashas; his rivals were in the army. Enver always wanted to stay away from politics. 
He dismissed the officers who got involved in political activities. He made a big 
revision in the army and German officers became influential within the Ottoman 
army. (Aydemir, 1993: 437) This development was also conceived with ambiguity 
by other nations.
The very entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War on the side of 
the Central Powers has been considered by some informed observers to have been 
largely motivated by Enver's Pan- Turk and anti- Russian designs (Emin, 1930: 64­
9). According to Landau (1995: 53), the Germans were evidently interested in 
exploiting Pan- Turkism and Pan- Islamism both in order to weaken Russia and to 
secure some hold over Central Asia's economic wealth. Besides, he states that 
Germany also promised support for changes in the Ottoman Empire's eastern 
frontier, which would enable it to have direct contact with the Muslim population in 
Russia. However, in his opinion, "It would be an exaggeration to surmise that Pan -
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Turkism was merely a camouflage for German imperialist designs in Central Asia, or 
that Pan- Turkism was merely a tool of the Germans. It is possible, indeed, that the 
Germans may well have promised Enver 'the liberation of the Caucasus and of 
Turkestan if the Ottoman Empire joined their side in the war against Russia." ( 1995: 
53)
4.2.5 World War I Episode:
A year after the end of the Balkan wars, the Ottoman Empire was at the verge 
of war again. The Balkan War had shown the empire's diplomatic isolation and the 
Unionists were convinced that continued isolation would mean the end of the empire 
(Zürcher, 1993: 116). Basically, they were prepared to accept any alliance rather than 
continued isolation.
First, Cemal Pasha approached the government in Paris, but he was brushed 
off. France and Britain, both having good relations with Russia expected more from 
collaboration with an alliance of Balkan states than from an Ottoman connection as 
far as the Levant was concerned. The Unionists then turned their eyes to the central 
powers. Austria- Hungary had sent out feelers about the possibilities of an anti­
Serbian alliance with the Ottomans and both Enver and Talat had given an 
encouraging response. On July 28, Enver Pasha, in a conversation with the German 
ambassador, openly proposed a defensive alliance with Germany (Zürcher, 1993: 
116). In the days that followed, a small circle of Young Turk leaders (Grand Vizier 
Sait Halim Pasha, Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, President of the Chamber Halil) 
negotiated in deepest secrecy with the Germans the details of an agreement. On 
August 2, 1914 the agreement was signed between the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany. However, three days after this agreement, the leaders saw the necessity of
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adding some clauses especially with the demands of Cemal Pasha. Hence the initial 
agreement had put the Ottoman Empire responsible to Germany without reciprocity. 
Among these clauses was the “expansion of the eastern border for building the 
connection with the Muslim population in the Caucasus” (Aydemir, 1993: 526). This 
was a proof of Enver Pasha's desire for creating an Islamic Unity with the Caucasian 
Muslims. This desire was apparent in Enver Pasha's mind even before the empire's 
entrance in the war. Enver Pasha seemed to have planned such a strategy long before. 
Thus, Enver was the most responsible figure for the entrance of the Ottoman Empire 
in the war and the most influential leader during the war. (Aydemir, 1993: 514)
Apart from the fear of isolation mentioned earlier, two other factors played a 
part in signing an agreement with the Central Powers that would make them enter the 
war. (Zürcher, 1993: 117) The German Empire was ready to sign an agreement with 
the Ottoman Empire as equal partners, which was a very important point for the 
Unionists, especially Enver Pasha, who had been trying to emancipate the country 
from its semi- colonial status. Secondly, the Ottomans were not aware of the fact that 
German strategic planning was dependent on knocking Russia's ally France out of 
war first, by means of an enveloping movement through Belgium-something, which 
would bring not only France, but almost certainly also Britain into the war. They 
probably expected a war with Russia only, and in that war they could expect 
Germany and Austria to win. Victory over Russia in turn could be expected to yield 
concrete results in the Caucasus and the Balkans. For them the attraction of the 
Ottoman alliance lay not in the contribution of the Ottoman army to the war, but in 
its effect on Muslims in the colonial empires of France and Britain.
When expectations of a short war proved unfounded, the importance of the 
Ottoman contribution in German eyes increased, the Sultan officially declared Holy
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War (Jihad) after consulting the §eyhulislam, on November 14. Expectations about 
the effect of this declaration on the Muslim inhabitants of the colonies of the Entente 
(and of Russian Central Asia) were very high among the Germans and also for Enver 
Pasha for his ideal to become real. In spite of a considerable propaganda effort by the 
Ottoman government, mainly through the Te§kilat-i Mahsusa, its effect was 
negligible. In spite of their doubts about the Ottoman military strength, the Germans 
encouraged an offensive strategy. They envisaged attacks on the Suez Canal and on 
Russian Transcaucasia. Enver Pasha enthusiastically embraced these plans. On the 
Caucasus front, the Russians were the first to attack in November, but the Ottoman 
army managed to stop them. A counter- offensive under the personal command of 
Enver Pasha started at the end of December. After a successful start, the Ottomans 
were heavily defeated at Sankami§, on the road to Kars, in January. According to 
Georgeon (1999: 119), attacking Russia was inevitable for the Ottomans because 
especially Enver Pasha was under the impact of Pan- Turkists who were considering 
the attack on Russia as “ the movement for the liberation of Turkish and Muslim 
population outside the Ottoman Empire”. According to them, this was different from 
the 1877-78 Turkish- Russian War, because this time the fight was for an ideal. 
Landau also makes a similar argument (1995: 52) and states that Enver Pasha had 
established relations with such well- known outside Turk activists as Ismail 
Gasprinsky, Fatih Kerimof and Arif Kerimof, and thus took certain steps to bring 
about the materialization of Pan- Turkism. According to him, the abortive offensive 
in Sankami? was a first sign of this commitment. However, Enver Pasha's defeat in 
that war disappointed Pan- Turkists as it proved the impossibility of the liberation of 
the Russian Turks with the help of the Ottoman army.
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Pasha also had Turanist tendencies in the beginning of the war before the Sarıkamış
defeat. Karabekir, in his book consisting of his memoirs "İstiklal Harbimiz" (Our
National Independence War) says that (1960: 35):
Enver Pasha, after giving me rakı near the table, wanted a big 
map of Iran from me. I immediately brought it. I put it on the middle 
of the table, right in front of him. I put a pair of compasses on it. This 
was a road and telegraph map. Enver Pasha stood up. He came near 
me. After looking at the map for a short time, he put his index finger 
on Teheran. He hit his finger on it a few times. And started to talk:
- Kazım' Do you know what I am thinking? I don't want to 
think, but do something about it. With ten thousand men, Teheran 
should be marched in a shortest way, after liberating Iran from 
Russian influence in this way, as was the case in Iran, propaganda 
should be made against the Russians and the British in Turkestan, 
Afghanistan and India! With another ten thousand men Dagestan 
should be reached through Tabriz, in order to foster Caucasian Islamic 
nations against the Russians!
In addition to the above argument, there is an important proof that Enver
According to Aydemir, the above feelings and thoughts of Enver Pasha was a 
result of his uncontrollable ego that usually influences young commanders in their 
lives. ( 1993: 21). He also states that, not only Enver Pasha but also most of the 
officers of his generation had the same thoughts. Hence, Kazım, who was listening to 
Enver Pasha about the above plans stated that he would volunteer for commanding 
such an attack.
The point was also made by the Turkish journalist Falih Rifki Atay, in his 
comparison between Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha ( 1953: 6):
Enver's special quality was boldness, Mustafa Kemal's was 
insight... Had Mustafa Kemal been Minister of War in 1914, he 
would not have pushed the country into the First World War; had 
Enver entered Izmir in 1922, with the same plan he would have turned 
back, marched on Syria and Iraq, and lost all that he had been won.
Landau presents another source about Enver's passion for Pan- Turkism as a 
political and military ideal by the French writer André Malraux published in 1948
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(1995: 51). Malraux devoted a chapter to the activities of his father, an Alsatian who 
had served for six years in the German Embassy in Istanbul and who had become one 
of Enver's closest and most trusted advisers. According to Malraux, his father was 
had become obsessed with the idea of Turan and had collaborated closely with Enver 
in the matter. Even before the war in Libya, Enver had coopted Muslim activists 
from among the Turkic groups in the Czarist Empire into the Young Turk circles. 
Enver also envisaged a union of all Turkic peoples from Edirne to the Chinese oases 
along the road of silk trade. He was unconcerned about Greece and Serbia having 
achieved their independence, so long as a substitute empire, with its capital 
Samarkand, could be set up.
Landau also argues that (1995: 53); the strong- handed exile of the Armenians 
may be partly seen as motivated by the wish to eliminate a barrier between the 
Ottoman Empire and several Turkic groups in Russia living near the frontiers. He 
continues to say that (1995: 53)" the Czarist Government's advocacy, before the war, 
of the establishment of an Armenian autonomous unit and the support given to this 
idea by certain Armenian groups, further aroused Pan- Turkist suspicions."
After the Russian Revolution in December 1917, anti- Bolshevik groups in 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan had formed the Republic of Transcaucasia with its 
capital in Tiflis. This republic refused to recognize the restoration of the border of 
1876, whereupon Ottoman troops forcibly occupied the area and the Ottoman 
government raised its territorial demands beyond what had been agreed at Brest- 
Litovsk. At Enver's own request, Ottoman High Command transferred its units badly 
needed on the Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts for a thrust into Southern Russia up 
to Baku. The campaign succeeded but resulted in the collapse of Ottoman armies in 
Syria and Mesopotamia and the subsequent Ottoman defeat. According to Landau
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(1995: 54), this indicates the Pan- Turk commitment of Enver and his associates. 
Zurcher states that ( 1993: 124), "The Russian Revolution had given a new impetus 
to Pan- Turkist ideas, and Enver himself now strongly favored the idea of a new 
empire built on a union with the Turkic areas in Central Asia to replace the areas lost 
in the Near East."
When the Transcaucasian Republic collapsed in May 1918, the Germans, 
who were primarily interested in access to the Baku oilfields, tried to restrain the 
Ottomans, but Enver pressed on, and Ottoman troops occupied Azerbaijan in 
September. Early in 1918, the Turkish delegation at Petrograd encouraged the 
separatist tendencies of Russia's Turkic groups, in the hope attaching Transcaucasia 
to the Ottoman Empire. In October 1918, Enver ordered Nuri Pasha, his brother and 
the Ottoman commander in Baku, to clear Azerbaijan of Russians and Armenians, in 
order to ensure Turkish- Turkic territorial continuity. Nuri Pasha established a troop 
there, which was called “Caucasian Islamic Army”. However, some obstacles were 
waiting for the army (Aydemir, 1993: 410). First of all, Armenians were getting 
ready to fight against this army. Secondly, the British who came from Iran in order to 
capture Baku from native Bolsheviks were also another threat. Thirdly, Germans also 
opposed such a movement, as this attack was not planned with the approval of the 
Central Powers.
The Turks of Turkestan proposed a report to Enver Pasha requesting the 
unification of their country with the Ottoman Empire. (Aydemir, 1993: 433). 
According to Aydemir, this report influenced Enver Pasha so much that; this would 
have been the spirit that had taken him to the struggle in Central Asia after he left the 
country. In the Southern Caucasus, he had not only been fighting for Azerbaijani 
Turks but also for the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus. He had created and
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directed a Muslim front in Africa during World War I. He would have taken action 
as a result of this report unless the Germans did not give ultimatum to withdraw from 
the Caucasus front.
A few days later, foreseeing the eventuality of withdrawal if peace was 
concluded, he ordered that Turkish officers be left in command of Azerbaijan and 
Northern Caucasus troops. As one British diplomat speculated at that time, it 
appeared that the Young Turk leadership proposed to establish an alternate Turkish- 
Turkic empire extending to the east and northeast of Istanbul. (Landau, 1995: 55)
By the time the Ottoman army entered Baku, the war had already been lost. 
The Unionist government now realized that it had no choice but to sue for an 
armistice. An armistice was signed between the Ottomans and the British on October 
31, 1918. In Enver Pasha's letter to Nuri dated October 15, 1918 he said, " We have 
lost the game". (Aydemir, 1993: 442)
4.2.6: The Teşkilat- ı Mahsusa Connection:
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was established by Enver Pasha in August 5, 1914. 
According to the Encyclopedia of AnaBritanica (1990, 561), its main aim was to 
organize Turks and Muslims that were faced with the threat of living out of Ottoman 
territories. It claims that; Enver Pasha's ideal- for uniting all the Turks in the world- 
was related to the Ottoman Empire's entry in to World War I. Proclamation of Cihad 
within this chaotic period would help make such an unification possible.
During World War I, it played an important role in the supression of 
seperatist movements in the Arab provinces and also in terror campaigns against 
Greek businesses in western Asia Minor. Besides, they continued to serve the 
committee paralel with the agents of the Benevolent Islamic Society, devoting much
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of their energy to guerrilla and sabotage activities among the Muslim subjects of the 
Triple Entente, chiefly in India and Central Asia, but also to Pan- Islamic propoganda 
there and in other areas such as China. It also operated outside the empire, where it 
tried to fan Muslim resistance to the Russian, French and British administrations in 
their respective colonial empires. Landau emphasizes their activities abroad and 
claims that its members carried Pan- Islamist and Pan- Turkist propoganda. (1995: 
52). According to him, they were sent to Iran, Afghanistan, India and elsewhere, 
depending on the Russian sources indicating that they crossed Transcaucasia.
During the early war years, Turkish agents- together with German ones 
headed by Dr. Werner Otto von Hentig- were busily recruiting support among the 
Turkic groups in Central Asia (Henderson, 1945: 90). Thousands of Pan- Turk and 
Pan- Islamic pamphlets were distributed in Afghanistan and in Russian and Chinese 
Turkestan. In August 1915, a joint Turco- German mission arrived in Kabul, where it 
was active until May 1916, leaving then for Herat and other border areas, including 
khybar; there they engaged in Ottoman and Pan- Turk propaganda until the war was 
over. In 1917, Turkish agents were arousing Pan- Turk sentiments in Bukhara, while 
in the Caucasus they were busy transporting money and firearms.
As a result of these activities, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was considered as 'state 
within state' and the role and authority of Enver Pasha was strenghthened. He 
organized his wartime plans according to the areas where the organization was 
strong; Sarıkamış, Suez Canal and Hoy. At the end of the war, Enver Pasha left the 
responsibility of the organization to Hüsamettin Ertürk. However, it lost its old 
performance and separated into small units in Istanbul. These units later on 
constituted the basis of “Karakol” organizations and Mim Mim Groups.
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4.2.7 His activities abroad after World War I:
By the end of the war, Pan- Islamist and especially Pan- Turkist ideas- as he 
was no more a strong Pan- Islamist as before after he lived the uprisings of the Arabs 
and their treachery during World War I- had taken hold of Enver Pasha and he 
expected the Turkic areas of Central Asia, and especially recently liberated 
Azerbaijan, to play a vital role in the continued struggle. That was why he had 
ordered the Ottoman divisions which had returned from Europe in 1918 to the 
Caucasus.
The armisitce was concluded on October 31, 1918 and the Ottoman Empire 
was forced to withdraw from the Caucasus and Iran and to accept the pre- war 
borders. On November 2, the leaders of the CUP, including Enver Pasha and Talat 
Pasha fled to Ukraine. Although several leaders played a role in 1918, the driving 
force seems to have been Enver, who was convinced that only the first phase of war 
had been lost and that just as in the Balkan War in 1913, the oppurtunity would come 
for a second round, in which the Ottomans could return to the offensive ( Ziircher, 
1993: 140). Enver was considering the defeat after World War I as an optimistic 
withdrawal. In his letter written to Ahmet İzzet Pasha, he presented his trip to 
Caucasia as his desire to serve Azerbaijan (Yamauchi, 1995: 19). Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha who stayed in Istanbul like Ahmet İzzet Pasha also estimated that Enver Pasha 
was going to establish a Turkic State there. (Yamauchi, 1995:19)
Enver, his uncle Halil and brother Nuri were planning to take advantage of 
their popularity in Azerbaijan and Daghestan. Halil and Nuri considered themselves 
as the ledears of the “Türkistan Republic” and the Republic at Batum, Kars and 
Ardahan. However, after the dissolution of his troops there and imprisonment of 
Halil and Nuri, Enver Pasha decided to go to Germany. The CUP leaders considered
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themselves as mediators. Enver declared Caucasus and Turkestan independence 
there. In 1919, he expressed his conditions to the English agents in Berlin ( 
Yamauchi, 1995: 22):
Turks are going to stay in Europe and they will keep a large 
portion of their existence in Asia. Recognition of the independence of 
Caucasus, Turkestan and Afghanistan, recognition of the 
independence of Sudan as in the case of Egypt, completion of Anglo- 
Egypt Agreement, Recognition of the self- determination of Arabia, 
resulting the decision about Izmir's and Thrace's fate on behalf of 
Turkey.
Another encouraging development for Enver Pasha to start his mission in 
Central Asia was the friendly attitude of the new Bolshevik government towards 
Turks. He started to think that Bolsheviks would help them in their struggle for their 
ideal to become real. The man, who was going to help set up a meeting between 
Enver Pasha and the Bolsheviks was Karl Radek who was the Secretary of the 
Comunist International imprisoned in Berlin. He recommended Enver Pasha to go to 
Moscow in order to propogate a Soviet- Muslim alliance against British imperialism. 
According to him, such an alliance could only become real by the unification of 
Bolshevik, Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist powers ( Yamauchi, 1995: 23). Radek 
promised the support of the Soviet government for Turkish liberation movement in 
return for Muslim support in their anti- British campaign. In Berlin, he aslo 
established contacts with the leaders of Volga Tatars and Crimean Tatars and with 
the Muslims in Dobruca and Romania. According to Aydemir ( 1993: 510), Enver 
Pasha's followers in Istanbul were expecting Enver Pasha to direct the Pan- Islamist 
and Pan- Turkist activities in Caucasia and Turkestan. Crimean Tatars were also 
giving information about the situation in Turkestan to Enver Pasha. Cafer Bey, who 
was one of the leading figures in the Turkestan liberation movement proposed Enver 
Pasha the conditions that Bolsheviks had to accept (Yamauchi, 1995: 25):
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1. Declaration of independence of the Muslim Republics.
2. Non- interference in the internal affairs of the Muslim countries.
3. Getting together the necessary ammunition and raw materials.
4. Amnesty for Muslim criminals.
At the same time, Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha had ordered the Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa to store arms and and ammunition in secret depots in a number of places in 
Anatolia. The Teşkilat- reconstituted in October 1918 as the Umum Alem-i Islam 
ittihadı Teşkilatı ( General Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic World) sent 
out emissaries with the instruction to organize guerrilla bands in the interior.They 
also planned to produce publications in Turkish and Arabic in order to spread their 
ideas to the Islamic world.
In August 1920, Enver Pasha, Halil Pasha and Cemal Pasha reached Moscow. 
There he immediately started to work for the establishment of the organization of the 
İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri ittihadı. He collected proper information about the Muslim 
leaders living in each country and determined the names accordingly. Overseas 
representations were going to be in Egypt, Syria, North Africa, India, Rome, and 
Berlin. East Turkestan, Afghanistan and Anatolia ( for which he was thinking 
Mustafa Kemal as the representative) were also going to be under the indirect control 
of the organization. In fact many of the revolutionary Asians were hoping for a Pan­
Islamic unity to become real ( Yamauchi, 1995: 48).
The organization also published a weekly newspaper called ' Liva'-i Islam' 
(The Islamic Standard). An Egyptian Pan- Islamist writer, Abdülaziz Çaviş, insisted 
on the language of the newspaper to be in Arabic. However, others wanted Arabic to 
be the second langauge after Turkish. This was going to be the first disagreement 
between the Turks and the Arabs within the organization.
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Enver was very hopeful about the organization. He was expecting an uprising 
in the Muslim world, a revolution in India and Iran, and the liberation of the “Eastern 
People”. What he really wanted was to raise a Turkish army in the Caucasus with 
Soviet money and arms to enter Anatolia at the head of this army (Ztircher, 1993: 
165). For this purpose, he was thinking of establishing a sub- unit only for 
establishing an organized movement in Anatolia.
Before he attented the “Congress of the Peoples of the East” that was going to 
be held in Baku in September 1920, the representatives of the Ankara government 
were in Moscow in order to make military and economic aid agreement with the 
Russians. When the meetings were locked, Enver acted as a mediator. However, 
Mustafa Kemal ,in his letter to Enver Pasha warned him about not to make them feel 
his Pan- Islamist tendencies (Aydemir, 1993:520):
A point that has to be considered seriously is that, the activities 
that are being taken in the Islamist countries like Turkestan, 
Afghanistan and Acemistan and the future plans about these areas 
should not be presented in a way that would make the Russians 
suspicious about any Pan- Islamist tendency. About this, the Ankara 
Government would like to hear from you properly.
Enver Pasha attended the “Congress of the Peoples of the East” in Baku in 
September 1920 as a representative of North Africa including Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Tripolitania, Egypt, Arabia and India. He gave a speech there, but it is not 
absolutely known whether he himself gave the speech or whether it was read by 
someone else. In his speech he used some words like 'The sovereignty of Allah', ' 
warriors of Islam', ' national self- determination' that may well prove his Pan­
Islamist and Pan- Turkist tendencies ( Yamauchi, 1995: 283). His main attitude was 
the opposition to the imperialism of Germany and Britain. In his notes after the Baku 
Congress, he wrote that his three targets are slowly becoming real ( Yamauchi, 1995: 
287):
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1. Support for the anti- British movement in the Muslim Eastern countries.
2. The export of the revolution to the Muslim Estern countries and their relationship 
with the democratic agencies.
3. Neglect of any non- Muslim government in the Muslim world.
After the congress, he drew up a partly Islamic, partly socialist radical 
programme and founded a party ( which was to be the Turkish affiliate of his 
worldwide Islamic revolutionary network), called the Halk Şuralar Fırkası ( People's 
Soviets Party). At the same time he tried to get Soviet support by posing as a more 
reliable left- wing alternative to Mustafa Kemal.
Islam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihatı held two congresses. The second congress 
was held in Moscow, in which the disagreement between the Arabs and Turks of the 
organization openly came to the surface. The Arab members were thinking that, the 
organziation put more emphasis on the Pan- Turkist elements rather than the Pan­
Islamist ones ( Yamauchi, 1995: 50). For that reason, they even wanted to resign. On 
the other hand, other members did not make any changes in their attitude. For 
example, Dr. Nazim was proud of his Pan- Turkist ideas and he was thinking that 
Turks were going to save the Muslims, but the reverse may never be possible. ( 
Yamauchi, 1995. 51). Enver Pasha, in his dateless letter to Cemal Pasha told about 
the low- standing of the non- Turkish people (Karabekir, 1990: 79).
4.2.8 His return to Anatolia as a liberator:
From the time he went out of the empire, Enver Pasha had one thing in mind:
To return to Anatolia to become the leader of a liberation movement.For example in
his letter to Halil Pasha dated December 5, 1920, he wrote ( Aydemir, 1993: 566-7):
...In the spring, 1 will be moving to Anatolia. If Russians give 
me a thousand men- has to be Muslim!- I am thinking of giving
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support in the Greek front ( During that period, there was a rumor that, 
Enver Pasha was coming to Anatolia with the ‘Green Army’) Or 
maybe, I can go to Anatolia by hiding my identity and work there with 
friends. If I have nothing to do other staying alone in Moscow. Let’s 
see what will happen next?...
In another letter to Cemal Pasha dated February 25, 1921, he wrote (Aydemir, 
1993: 561):
...I am not happy with what is going on in Anatolia nowadays.
I do not like it. I have met with the Entente representatives in 
Moscow, and nearly convinced them to help a country ( Anatolia) that 
needs so much peace for the time being. Ankara, just in the opposite 
way, turned to Russia and personal dictatorship instead. With this, 
they would not be able to make the Russians happy also, and may be 
they will go in the direction that I would really be afraid of...
Based on the above sources, it is very obvious that, Anatolia had become the 
target for Enver Pasha. Aydemir argues that (1993:561), this had always been the 
ultimate aim for Enver Pasha, and he should have left his Pan- Islamist and Pan- 
Turkist claims aside.
In the spring of 1921, Enver Pasha decided to revise the political program of 
the Halk Şuralar Fırkası. In that way, he was planning to construct a political plan 
besides a military one. The new program supported the Caliphate and the Sultanate 
and ,in a way, it was a Bolshevik discourse ( Yamauchi, 1995: 62). The reason why 
he preferred a radical change was his desire to make the difference between himself 
and Mustafa Kemal as wide and visible. Thus, he tried to get Soviet support by 
posing as a more relaible left- wing alternative to Mustafa Kemal.
What he really wanted was to raise a Turkish army in the Caucasus with 
Soviet money and arms and then to enter Anatolia at the head of this army. In the 
spring and summer of 1921, this idea might have been successful in view of the 
critical situation on the western front and the critism within the assembly in Ankara 
of Mustafa Kemal's conduct of war, but Soviet support was not forthcoming. The
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Bolsheviks kept Enver dangling for some time, using him as an implicit threat 
against Ankara. When they finally signed a friendship treaty with Ankara and it 
became clear that they would not support his scheme, Enver decided to go to 
Anatolia alone, relying on his reputation.
On July 30, he left Moscow for Batum on the Turkish border. He was refused 
entry into Turkey, but in Batum he was met by supporters from Anatolia and he was 
in constant touch with leading members from the nationalist organization across the 
border in Trabzon. He even held a congress in Batum, not as the People's Soviets 
Party, but as the Party of Union and Progress. This shows that he now no longer 
depended on Soviet support, but aimed at the support of the Unionists in the 
nationalist organization ( Ziircher, 1993: 166). However, it was too late for him, as 
while he was busy on the border, the battle on the Sakarya (September 1921) resulted 
in victory. This not only saved Ankara, but possibly also Mustafa Kemal's position. 
Enver stayed on for two weeks and left for good. He decided to spend the rest of his 
life for the independence of Turkestan and the Muslim people of the East.
4.2.9 Enver Pasha’s struggle in Turkistan:
Enver went to Bukhara and ordered his uncle Halil to organize the 
movements in Iran and the Caucasia. According to Bayur ( 1983: 210), Enver Pasha- 
although he had lost all his hopes with the victory of Sakarya led by Mustafa Kemal- 
he was still hopeful in establishing a unified Turkish Republic. When he arrived in 
Bukhara, he learnt that Turkestan's national uprising against Soviet Russia - called 
'Basmachi'- was at its peak. He decided to command this army and this was 
welcomed by nearly all Muslim warriors. (Miicahit). However, the opposition came 
from some of the tribal chieftains and Velidi Togan.
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Enver Pasha's political ideal in Turkestan was both Pan- Islamist and Pan- 
Turkist. Yal9 inkaya states that (1997: 273), there are no differences between the 
concepts Pan- Turkism and Pan- Islamism when Russia is considered as these two 
movements were imposed by the Westerners. This argument supports why Enver 
Pasha used both Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist propaganda at the same time while he 
was in Turkestan. It has to be remembered that, before and during World War I, he 
used Pan- Islamist and Pan- Turkist propaganda at different times in the Ottoman 
Empire. But as it is obvious, this was not the case in his struggle in Turkestan.
After Enver Pasha started to direct the Basmaci movement, he called for the 
establishment of a ' Biiyiik Islam Devletf (Great Islamic Empire) and unification of 
the Central Asian Muslim Republics ( Costagne, 1980: 235). According to Yamauchi 
(1995: 72), he used the titles of "The Commander of the Islamic Army", "Brother- 
in- law of the caliph" and "The Representative of Muhammed" in order to attract the 
attention to the Pan- Turk ideal with all means possible. Enver pasha, in his letter to 
King of Afghanistan, Emanullah Han, wrote that: ( Yamauchi, 1995: 74)" Under our 
command,Eastern Islamic Confederation will be established by ending up the 
Russian rule. We are grateful for Your Majesty's support. By this way, a state that is 
capable of standing alone in the world, like the German Confederation, will be 
established."
This was a tremendeous project which would cover Eastern Turkestan and 
Afghanistan. Without doubt, Enver desired to plan an important role in the 
establishment of such Pan- Islamist and Pan- Turkist state. Enver Pasha died at a 
Russian attack on August 4, 1922. With his death, the Pan- Turkist ideals of the CUP 
members in exile were also lost.
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CONCLUSION
Enver Pasha was one of the most interesting figures in Turkish history who 
started his military career as a hero but ended up as a loser. Undoubtly, he was a real 
patriot, but seemed to make some wrong choices throughout his life. Perhaps, as 
Yalçınkaya argues (1997: 276), he should not be judged so severely. It is important 
to analyze the conflicting views of the historians about the political ideals of Enver 
Pasha in order to better evaluate on the argument that is presented in this thesis. 
Hence, this would also help catch some of the details about his character.
On the one hand, according to Aydemir- who met Enver Pasha when he was a 
student in Moscow (1993: (Vol II) 490), Enver Pasha was neither a Pan- Turkist nor 
Turanist but he was an Ottomanist and a Pan- Islamist. This was simply because of 
the fact that while the Ottoman Empire was practicing Ottomanist and Pan- Islamist 
policies Enver Pasha was the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. So, 
he was in a way compelled to do so. Secondly, in Aydemir's opinion, Enver Pasha 
influenced the Sultan to declare Cihad after the beginning of World War I. Aydemir 
considers this attitude of Enver Pasha as Pan- Islamist tendencies. However, after 
saying this Aydemir states that, this did not find so much support from the Muslim 
states. In fact, many Muslim tribesorganized several uprisings against the Ottomans. 
Additionally, Aydemir tells that Enver Pasha also involved in Pan- Turkist and 
Turanist activities like supporting Türk Ocağı Derneği, but this was not his ultimate 
ideal.
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On the other hand, according to Landau (1995: 51), Enver Pasha had the most 
definite ideas in favor of Pan- Turkism and its crucial future role as an expansionist 
policy, and he was the one largely responsible for its adoption as a state policy 
among the three policy- makers among Talat, Cemal and himself. He refers to the 
book ( Les Noyers de VAltenburg) of the renowned French writer André Malraux 
who devoted a long chapter to the activities of his father, an Alsatian who had served 
for six years in the German Embassy in Istanbul and who had become one of Enver 
Pasha's closest and most trusted advisers. Malraux's father had become obsessed with 
the idea of Turan and had collaborated closely with Enver in the matter. Even before 
the war in Libya, Enver had coopted Muslim activists from among the Turkic groups 
in the Czarist Empire into the Young Turk circles. Even at that time, Enver 
envisaged a union of all Turkic people from Edime to the Chinese oases along the 
road of the silk trade. As soon as oeace had been secured in the Balkans, Enver's 
emissaries contacted the Emirs of Bukhara and Afghanistan, as well as the Khans of 
Russian Turkistan. In Landau's opinion (1995:52), the real existence of Turan had 
become an ideé fixe  for Enver Pasha.
He further states the certain practical steps that Enver Pasha did take to bring 
about the materialization of Pan- Turkism. First of all, the very entry of the Ottoman 
Empire into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers was motivated by 
Enver's Pan- Turkist designs. Secondly, the abortive offensive in the Caucasus in late 
1914 and early 1915 was a sign of Enver Pasha's commitment to Pan- Turkism. 
Thirdly, the struggle with the Armenians may be partly seen as motivated by the 
wish to eliminate a barrier between Turkey and several Turkic groups in Russia 
living near the frontiers. Fourthly, during World War I, Turkish agents made 
intensified Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist propaganda throughout Russian Central
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Asia, Afghanistan and Turkistan under the command of Enver. Fifthly, at Enver's 
own request, the Ottoman High Command transferred units badly needed on the 
Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts for a thrust into Southern Russia up to Baku. 
According to Landau, this again indicates the Pan- Turk commitment of Enver and 
his associates. Sixthly, Enver ordered Nuri Pasha to clear Azerbaijan of Russians and 
Armenians in order to ensure Turkic- Turkish continuity. Lastly, the arrival of Enver 
himself in Central Asia in 1921, his command of the Basmachi forces and his 
assumption of the title of 'Emir of Turkistan' appeared to many as the realization of 
the Pan- Turk ideal.
Landau also claims that (1990: 104), Enver Pasha carried out Pan- Islamist 
activities far from the limelight. For example, Enver Pasha, wishing to stir trouble 
among the Muslims of British India, suggested an expedition into India to Mustafa 
Kemal; but Mustafa Kemal refused this offer as too being fanciful. Secondly, a Pan­
Islamist circle Jihan-i Islam was run after 1914, by Enver Pasha. In India, it was 
distributed free of charge in many cities and towns.
Like Landau, Yamauchi, who analyses Enver Pasha's life and letters covering 
the period after World War I, refers to the Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist tendencies 
of Enver Pasha (1995: 74). He gives interesting details about these ideals. For 
example, Mustafa Kemal's information and conception of Enver Pasha's Pan­
Islamist tendencies, Enver Pasha's friendship with Karl Radek who suggested him to 
go to Moscow in order to materialize a Pan- Turkist, Pan- Islamist and Bolshevik 
alliance, a presumption of a Japanese diplomat considering the Baku Congress as the 
Pan- Islamist Conference were among these details. He further claims that, Enver 
Pasha desired to play the most important role in a Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist 
state. According to him, Enver's Turanist tendencies were never properly understood
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and the Pan- Turk ideal for the Young Turks in exile ended with Enver's death in
1922.
Another Turkish researcher, Kutay states that (1955: 11) Enver and Cemal 
were the pioneers of Pan- Islamism within the CUP. They both believed that; the 
Czarist Russia was going to be dissolved as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution; 
with the power of the fifty million Turks in Turkistan, an uprising would begin 
against the British in India and with the help of eighty million Muslims there, Pan- 
Islamism would be realized. However, he also states that Enver Pasha’s biggest ideal 
was Pan- Turkism and Pan- Turanism because such kind of an ideal was parallel with 
his character. When he arrived in Bukhara in 1921, he was welcomed with a big 
ceremony in the city and the people were shouting “ Longlive Turan, Longlive Enver 
Pasha, Longlive Islam” (1955: 12).
He further claims that, Enver Pasha was a Pan- Turkist while he was in 
struggling against the rule of Abdulhamid II. After he became one of the most 
powerful leaders in the Ottoman Empire, he was compelled to be a Pan- Islamist 
because of the political situation in the empire just before the beginning of World 
War I. According to him, these ideologies also clashed within the CUP. Thus, in such 
a situation, it was difficult for a leader not to be pragmatic.
Another important source is the memoirs of Zeki Velidi ( Togan). He was a 
professor of history' and at the same time a scholar devoted to writing about the 
history of his nation, but also worked to secure its intellectual, cultural, civil and 
political independence. He became a leader of the Turkistan National Liberation 
Movement in Central Asia called the Basmachi Movement by the Russians. In his 
memoirs, he wrote (1993: 135):
There were three types of Basmachi: “Emiristsl, “semi- 
Emirists” and “anti- Emirists. The Political spectrum of the
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Basmachi did not end there. Cemal Pasha wished to manage 
the problems of Türkistan and the Basmachi from Kabul. 
Enver Pasha, on the other hand, was conducting propaganda 
from Moscow for a pro- Bolshevik “Union of Islam”. This had 
some consequences.
Togan also discussed the relationship between Enver and Cemal Pashas and 
the Turkish National Society (Paksoy, 1993: 141):
Even before I became chairman of the Central 
Committee of Türkistan National Unity, I was a member of 
that body. Therefore, it is necessary to delve into the relations 
between Enver and Cemal Pashas and the Society. They sought 
to join forces with the Bolsheviks by forming the “Islamic 
Revolutionary Society” for the purpose of liberating the 
Islamic world from European imperialism.
In another part, he talked about Enver’s political shift, his strategic change 
from Pan- Islamism to Pan- Turkism and his anti- Bolshevik action (Paksoy, 1993: 
143):
Enver Pasha’s arrival in Bukhara, especially his plans, 
were a totally unexpected development for us. A few months 
ago this person was engaged in propaganda through the 
pamphlets of the “Union of Islam” and others, in connection 
with Cemal Pasha, advocating cooperation with the Bolsheviks 
against imperialism. He was now not only taking a position 
against the Bolsheviks, but also actually had brought plans to 
attack them... Enver Pasha told me that he had been in Soviet 
Russia for over a year now; (he had seen) that the Bolsheviks 
were despicable people and he had come to the conclusion that 
it was necessary to liberate the Muslems from Red Imperialism 
before any other imperialism...I wrote down fourteen reasons 
why he should not join the Basmachi, and sent it to him... If 
you join this struggle, the Türkistan movement may assume a 
Pan- Islamist character...This could cause the Russians resident 
in Türkistan to unite with the Bolsheviks, for their national 
objectives, against us...
On the other hand, he also praised Enver Pasha ( Kutay, 1955: 28-9):
It was the first time that I have seen Enver Pasha. He 
was one of the most important figures in recent Turkish 
history. Thus, I still believe in this. Especially, his death in the
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name of liberation of Turkistan leaves no room for suspecting 
his idealist character. This person, did not have his place in the 
Turkish and world history by chance... the reason that the 
Russians consider his Pan- Islamist tendencies as adventurist is 
because of their hatred and fear against his struggle.
From the above memoirs of Togan, one has to derive again that Enver Pasha 
used both Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist policies during his struggle in Turkistan. As 
it is stated earlier, Pan- Turkism and Pan- Islamism did not mean so different 
concepts for the Turks living in Central Asia. They needed an “irredentist discourse” 
and Enver Pasha gave them what they wanted, using both of the policies when 
needed. In fact, what he had done during his career was to adopt one of the three 
policies according to the circumstances. That is why the political situation and the 
pan- movements in the Ottoman Empire and other parts of the world during his 
lifetime are discussed throughout the thesis. He was not a pragmatic leader but 
influenced by the external factors easily. In addition to this, he was capable of 
attracting the people with great ideals. “Hope” was the only thing that the people 
needed living in an empire that was at the edge of collapse.
Whether he adopted Pan- Turkist, Pan- Islamist or Ottomanist tendencies at 
different times of his life, he was a real practitioner of these pan- movements. If his 
activities are adapted to the common characteristics of the pan- movements that are 
presented by Landau (1995:), the following argument can be stated. First of all, he 
attempted to impose his ideas especially during the war time both within the Ottoman 
Empire and Central Asia through propaganda. Secondly, he aimed at the revival of 
an ancient culture that is the “Great Land of Turan”. Thirdly, he established an 
organization -Te§kilat-i Mahsusa- in order to make Pan- Turkist and Pan- Islamist 
propaganda. Fourthly, he was also in contact with the intellectuals called “Outside 
Turks” and financed Pan- Turkist publications. He led his ideology in different states
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due to some indispensable circumstances (Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I) 
and his ideology underwent some transmission as he arrived in the Central Asia. 
Lastly, he hardly found support from the existing authorities.
Enver Pasha was an Ottomanist when he began his career as a military officer 
in the Balkans. As he improved his career fast with the Bab-i Ali Coup and the 
liberation of Edime, he started to adopt Pan- Islamist tendencies. Undoubtly, the 
international conjuncture in which the German Empire was the dominant influence 
upon the Ottoman Empire further fostered Enver Pasha’s Pan- Islamist tendencies. 
Covering the period starting with the last period of World War I and ending with his 
death, he practiced Pan- Islamist and Pan- Turkist policies and these policies were 
his “preferences” in his struggle in Central Asia.
Without doubt, Enver Pasha was one of the most interesting and criticized 
figures in Turkish history. Interestingly, after the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, and the 
establishment of the independent Turkic states in the Central Asia after the 
dissolution of U S S R, unification along the cultural and political lines with these 
Turkic states came to the agenda of Modem Turkey once again. In a globalizing 
world where it is argued that the concept of nation- states is being disappeared, the 
success of a pan- movement can only be measured in some period of time. 
Nevertheless, the story of Enver Pasha does not seem to stand in the archives of 
history. The books telling his story will be turned over again.
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